NFC North: Football Outsiders
Those of you with ESPN Insider subscriptions can view this comprehensive Football Outsiders analysis of the NFC North's salary cap situations.
Individual cap numbers have grown less significant to the general public in recent years as the salary cap ceiling has grown exponentially. Most NFL teams can fit every player they want under their cap limit. Some have resorted to artificially inflating cap numbers to consume excess space, a polar reversal from the frenzied cap years of the late 1990's -- when teams were forced to release players or renegotiate their contracts in order to make the cap work.
With all that said, I thought I'd give you a snippet of FO's analysis. You might have heard of the term "dead money." It refers to the amount of cap space devoted to players who no longer are on the roster. Some degree is unavoidable, as teams release players all the time when they are in the midst of multi-year contracts. The player no longer receives the cash, but by NFL rule he still counts partially against the team's cap allotment.
Careful planning and reasonable contracts can limit dead money, leaving more cap space to use for players who are on the roster. Below, you'll see the player on each NFC North team that consumes the most amount of "dead money." This year, Minnesota has done the best job of limiting its excesses. Here you go:
Tailback Cedric Benson ($2.509 million)
Defensive tackle Cory Redding ($7.333 million)
Defensive end Kabeer Gbaja-Biamila ($1.571 million)
Tailback Maurice Hicks ($300,000)
Another take on projecting 2009 performances
On Tuesday, we brought you some computer-generated projections on the impact Brett Favre might have on Minnesota and the NFC North if he signs with the Vikings last summer.
For context and perspective, I wanted to pass along another version of the individual projections for Vikings quarterbacks from Football Outsiders, among the most respected practitioners of statistical analysis in football.
Below are Football Outsiders' projections for Favre, Tarvaris Jackson and Sage Rosenfels over the 16-game 2009 season:
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Football Outsiders uses a different method than the one employed by AccuScore, which developed Tuesday's projections. Football Outsiders utilizes a regression analysis that takes into account a broad range of about 50 factors that include strength of schedule, historic trends and how the larger team is expected to perform.
That information is plugged into an analytic formula rather than used to play out "digital seasons," as AccuScore does.
I'm not coming down in favor of either method. While many of the numbers are different, they nevertheless tell the same fundamental story: Favre would have a better season than either Jackson or Rosenfels as the Vikings' 2009 quarterback. (The margin is greater for Football Outsiders.)
It's also interesting that both groups project Favre to throw more interceptions than Jackson, likely because of Favre's downfield aggressiveness relative to Jackson's checkdown mentality. Both groups also projected Jackson to complete a sub-par 56 percent of his passes.
As we discussed Tuesday, projections should never be considered gospel. I view them as educated, fact-based guesses on future performance based on reasonable factors -- except ones like injuries and personnel changes that will inevitably occur and could never be predicted.
Our friends over at Football Outsiders are always looking for new ways to identify statistical trends that unveil notable but sometimes unseen achievements. In an ESPN Insider piece this week, FO dug up an interesting -- if ultimately limited -- distinction for Chicago cornerback Charles Tillman.
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| Michael Sackett/US Presswire | |
| Does Charles Tillman's reputation for physical play cause receivers to drop passes? |
Under those terms, "forcing a drop" would seem to be an oxymoron. By definition, receivers dropped the ball under no particular duress from opponents. That would make drops more of a coincidence than a reflection of a defender's skill. The statistic could also be inflated by the number of times a cornerback is thrown at.
On the other hand, we've all heard so much about the intimidation factor -- the mental register a receiver makes of a cornerback's presence. Could Tillman's reputation as a physical corner -- or, more specifically, his well-known ability to strip the ball -- impact a receiver's concentration?
It makes intuitive sense, and I'm sure there have been instances when a receiver loses concentration because he's aware Tillman is preparing to swipe at the ball. But Football Outsiders' study offers no evidence to suggest Tillman has consistently "forced" receivers to drop the ball during his career. In 2007, for example, receivers dropped four of 93 passes against him, which finished below the NFL average that season.
My own opinion: If forcing drops is a skill rather than coincidence, it's one built by reputation over time. I'm not willing to completely write off this category as a fluke. The mere presence of a physical cornerback can impact at least some weak-minded receivers.
What do you think?
I have a hunch you'll be interested in these numbers as you munch your Sunday brunch. That is, if you can stop thinking about green eggs and ham after reading the preceding sentence.
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Anyway, we've analyzed the Jay Cutler trade in just about every way imaginable, but there's one more we couldn't begin to touch on our own. Our friends at Football Outsiders bring a unique perspective of quantitative analysis to the NFL, and their take on Cutler's career thus far is informative and revealing.
There has been plenty of discussion about Cutler's role in the Broncos' offensive success relative to their long-proven system and stable of talent. How much was Cutler and how much was Brandon Marshall, Eddie Royal and Mike Shanahan? And how good could have Cutler been if the Broncos maxed out at 8-8 last season?
The Outsiders crew judges quarterbacks based on what they add to an offense, comparing their performance to that of an "average" quarterback. The statistic is known as DYAR (Defensive-adjusted Yards After Replacement). If you're curious about how this works, check here.
You'll need an Insider subscription to read the entirety of this analysis from Outsiders' Aaron Schatz. But in Schatz's estimation, Cutler was one of the five best quarterbacks in the NFL last season. Based on DYAR, Cutler threw for 1,382 more yards than an "average" quarterback would have in the Broncos' offense.
Meanwhile, based on Outsiders' methods, Cutler last year played with the second-worst NFL defense in the past 15 seasons. And, as we humbly noted Friday, Cutler had a 94.2 passer rating in the fourth quarter last season. Those two measures would seem to limit his responsibilities for the Broncos' eight losses last season.
I know these statistics are neither fool-proof nor without exception. But I always like the way Outsiders provides reasoned documentation to back up or contradict anecdotal observations.
You'll need an Insider subscription to read a full accounting of Football Outsiders' take on Georgia quarterback Matthew Stafford, currently among a handful of likely candidates for Detroit's No. 1 overall pick in the draft.
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| AP Photo/John Bazemore | |
| Matthew Stafford's completion percentage went up significantly each year he was at Georgia. |
But there is one thing I can share. Outsiders relies on a pair of statistics to predict NFL success for college quarterbacks: Completion percentage and games played. Here is David Lewin's full explanation for that approach.
Lewin studied drafted quarterbacks since 1996 and found that, in most cases, a high college completion percentage (over 60 percent) and a suitable number of starts (about three season's worth) were strong indicators of success. Quarterbacks don't generally improve their accuracy against better competition in the NFL, Lewin found. Meanwhile, extensive experience speaks for itself.
Exceptions were made for certain offensive systems that artificially elevate completion percentages, as well as for schools with poor running games that could hamper the passing attack.
Stafford faced neither obstacle at Georgia. Here are his career numbers:
Completion percentage: 57.1
Games: 33
Those figures put Stafford below Outsiders' threshold for rising NFL stars. That doesn't mean Stafford will fail in the NFL. But it does suggest he has some deficiencies that you might hope to avoid with a No. 1 overall draft pick.
My two cents: It's only fair to note that Stafford's completion percentage increased significantly in each of his three seasons at Georgia. He went from 52.7 as a freshman to 55.7 as a sophomore to 61.4 last season. The fact that he didn't light it up as a freshman doesn't bother me too much, especially knowing he moved the curve in the right direction.
Digging deeper into the numbers (game)
Whether it's fair or not, the "Moneyball" tag has chased new Detroit coach Jim Schwartz for most of the past five years. Ever since my AFC South colleague Paul Kuharsky wrote this story in a 2003 edition of The (Nashville) Tennessean, Schwartz has been as known for his reliance on statistical analysis as he has been for being the primary schemer of the Titans' perennially successful defense.
So on Friday I called Aaron Schatz, the president of Football Outsiders and one of main analysts Schwartz has worked with over the years. Is Schwartz some kind of computer nerd? Or is he a football coach looking for an edge?
"When people read that Jim has an economics degree from Georgetown," Schatz said, "I think they picture somebody like me walking around on the sideline. He's not me. He is a football coach. I've been there to visit him, and he is very much a classic coach. He screams at players when they need to be screamed at. He works on the sideline, instead of in the booth, because he wants to know their emotions.
"I've always thought of him as a coach who is also willing to include statistical analysis in his preparation," Schatz added. "He's open to it. That's all. He's just trying to be whole and consider everything."
Schatz, whose Football Outsiders work appears on ESPN.com, has also conducted studies for Schwartz on a consultant basis. Some of them, Schatz said, have been related to game management and directed toward the five head-coaching interviews Schwartz has had over the years.
What are the best times to go for it on fourth down? When should a penalty be declined? Where is the dividing line between too many and not enough carries for a running back?
Schatz's role is to find every example of a given scenario during a set time period -- say, every game of the previous season -- and determine which decision was the most successful. At the very least, the results give the coach a historical profile to help develop strategy.
Here's an example: Based on its analysis, Football Outsiders found that NFL teams throw too often in short-yardage situations. In 2004, for instance, Schatz looked at every third or fourth down in which the yardage to be gained was three or fewer yards. In every situation, teams converted more often by running than by throwing.
That even includes third-and-3, where teams passed 75 percent of the time in 2004. They converted 52 percent of those instances. But when NFL teams ran on third-and-3, their conversion rate jumped to 59.7.
Does that mean Schwartz will run on every short-yardage situation in Detroit? No. But he will be armed with this knowledge: In general, running plays are more successful in those situations.
One area that helped Schwartz in Tennessee: Football Outsiders' emphasis on the importance of third-down defense. Schwartz designed his practice schedule to maximize the amount of time his players worked on defenses they most often used in third-down situations.
Third-down defense is measured by percentage converted. Of the teams with the six lowest percentages in the NFL during 2008, five made the playoffs. (The 9-7 Chicago Bears were the only omission.) Nine of the top 11 teams in that category finished the season with a winning record. The Titans were ranked No. 6.
"There's not a football coach in the United States ... that doesn't use statistics to some degree," Schwartz said Friday at his introductory news conference in Detroit. "What we tried to do is to identify the important stats ... to try to find out what's meaningful. What correlates to wins?
"The biggest thing that it does is it gives us an idea how to best use your practice time."
So rest assured, Lions fans. While your new coach knows his way around a computer and understands numbers, it would be difficult to refer to him as a nasty name that rhymes with bird.
ABOUT THIS BLOG
Kevin Seifert
Seifert joined ESPN.com in 2008 after covering the Minnesota Vikings for the Minneapolis Star Tribune for eight years. He lives in the Twin Cities with his wife and children.
