ESPN MLB

Tim Keown has a terrific piece on ballpark dimensions and the angst sluggers face these days in places like Miami and San Diego.

I want to focus on one quote in the piece. Heath Bell said, "The one thing I always say about a big ballpark: There should be a lot of hits. There's more space, but right now everyone thinks they have to hit home runs. Whatever happened to a guy trying to hit .400? What's wrong with 200 hits? Hit the ball on the ground, hit line drives in the gaps."

In theory, maybe he's right in suggesting hitters are swinging too much for the fences. The problem with his "put the ball in play" suggestion is that strikeout rates are increasing. In 1992, the year before offense exploded, the major league strikeout rate was 5.6 K's per nine innings. By 1996, it had shot up to 6.5 K's per nine. However, while strikeout rates were increasing, so was everything else: batting average (.256 in 1992, .270 in 1996), walks (3.3 per nine to 3.6) and, of course, home runs (0.7 to 1.1). Basically, hitters were willing to strike out more because there were positive gains to be made in hitting the ball harder when you did make contact.

Those numbers were basically fairly steady through 2007. Run-scoring during this era actually peaked in 2000 at 5.14 runs per game, but in 2007 it was still at 4.80. Jake Peavy was the only major league starter that year with an ERA under 3.00.

And then the pitchers took over. Since 2007, strikeouts have increased from 6.7 to 7.3 per nine innings. Walks, which hit 3.8 per nine in 2000, have decreased from 3.3 per nine in 2007 to 3.2. Batting average has declined from .268 in 2007 to .249, which if it holds would be the lowest since a .244 mark in 1972. Scoring runs was so problematic in the American League that year that it instituted the designated hitter rule for 1973. Home runs have dropped from 1.02 per game in 2007 to 0.94. And runs per game have fallen from 4.80 to 4.17.

So is Bell right? Should hitters focus more on putting the ball in play? The kicker here: In 2007, the batting average on balls in play (which doesn't include home runs) was .303. In 2011, it was .295. In 2012, it's down to .290. For what it's worth, back in 1992, when hitters didn't hit as many home runs or strike out as much, and supposedly focused more on contract, it was .285. Back in 1973, when hitters struck out even less (5.3 K's per nine innings), it was .281. In 1992, teams averaged 4.12 runs per game; in 1973, 4.21.

What's it all mean? The pitchers are too good now. The only reason teams are scoring as many runs as they did in 1992 or 1973 -- despite the current low batting averages -- is because they're hitting more home runs. Hitting fewer home runs and trying to get more singles and doubles isn't a solution to more runs scored, not with strikeout rates so high.

So, yes, moving in the fences in some parks will help the run-scoring environment to a small extent. But it won't solve the bigger trend the game is undergoing: The pitchers are simply better than the hitters right now.

Perhaps the most phenomenal fact of life in baseball today is that major league teams continue to use first-round picks for high school pitchers. You could call it the Brien Taylor/Todd Van Poppel phenomenon. If you study the issue, it is just stunningly obvious that the frequency with which these draft picks pay off is something like one-third to one-quarter of the payoff rate for other first-round picks. It has been obvious for twenty years that this is a stupid, stupid game, to use a first-round pick for a high school pitcher -- yet every year, four to seven first-round picks are invested in these turkeys.
-- Bill James, "The New Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract"

That book came out in 2001, so the obvious question: Have things changed? Are high school pitchers still turkeys? Keith Law has a column looking back at the 2002 draft -- the infamous "Moneyball" draft, but also a year that included first-round high school selections Zack Greinke, Cole Hamels and Matt Cain. Pass the gravy, please.

The draft began in 1965. Through 1986 it included various secondary phases, primarily for those players who had been previously drafted. For the purpose of this piece and for what Bill James was referring to, I'm focusing on the regular June phase. First, to verify Bill's statement, let's compare high school pitchers versus college pitchers for the first 30 years of the draft. (Bill probably wrote the above in 2000, so couldn't have properly evaluated the late '90s drafts at that point.)

From 1965 through 1994, 167 high school pitchers were drafted in the first round (I did not count supplemental first-round picks). Nineteen of them would end up compiling a career Baseball-Reference.com WAR total of at least 10.0 -- or 11 percent of those selected. From 1965 through 1994, 140 college pitchers were drafted in the first round. Thirty-four compiled a career WAR of at least 10.0, or 24 percent. So using that arbitrary cutoff point as a measure of success, college pitchers were twice as likely to have a solid major league career.

Here, the top 20 pitchers in each grouping.


So it's pretty clear that drafting college pitchers was a better investment. And to show there isn't some bias based on draft position involved here, there were 33 college pitchers in this era selected in the top five picks and 34 high school pitchers.

What have we seen in the past 17 years, since 1995? There has been a philosophical change; there have been 157 college pitchers selected in the first round compared to 110 high school pitchers. In "Moneyball," Billy Beane memorably made an emphasis about drafting undervalued college players. In truth, that belief was already in motion by the 2002 draft, at least in terms of pitchers. Over the previous 10 drafts, there had been 94 college first-round pitchers compared to 66 high school first-rounders.

Obviously, many of the careers from the 1995-2011 draft years are still in progress or just beginning, so these numbers will change. So far, 18 college pitchers have accumulated at least 10 WAR (11 percent); 16 high school pitchers have accumulated at least 10 WAR (15 percent). Those 16 high school pitchers have also accumulated more WAR than the 18 college guys -- 382.7 to 295.6.

The top high school pitchers include Roy Halladay, CC Sabathia, Josh Beckett, Cain, Greinke, Hamels, Jon Garland, Adam Wainwright, John Danks, Clayton Kershaw and Chad Billingsley. High schoolers potentially on the rise (yet to accumulate 10 WAR) include Madison Bumgarner, Phil Hughes and Rick Porcello. The top college pitchers include Barry Zito, Justin Verlander, Jered Weaver, Tim Lincecum, Ben Sheets, Jeremy Guthrie, Mark Mulder, Matt Garza, Ricky Romero and David Price. Guys on the rise include Ian Kennedy, Max Scherzer, Daniel Bard, Brandon Morrow, Stephen Strasburg and Chris Sale.

So, front offices and scouts have flipped James' investment advice around. High school pitchers have become equal -- or better -- investments than college pitchers. So what happened? Some theories:

1. High school pitchers were "overdrafted" in early drafts. While college baseball wasn't as mature in the 1960s and 1970s as it is now, there was also bias against college players in the early years of the draft. For example, from 1965 through 1978 only 17 college pitchers were selected in the first round compared to 97 high school pitchers. This held true for position players as well. In 1971, for example, all 24 first-round picks were high school players. A college infielder named Mike Schmidt went in the second round. In 1976, only three high schoolers were drafted in the first round. Simply put, old-school baseball guys often preferred high school kids over college players for no other reason than they were high school kids.

2. Selection bias. If more kids (especially more talented kids) are playing college baseball than in the '60s and '70s, that could suggest only the best high school pitchers are now getting drafted in the first round. Instead of drafting high school arms and letting the rigors of pro ball weed out the best ones, front offices eventually realized the smarter approach was to let college baseball essentially do that weeding out -- whether it be from a talent level or from a pitcher's ability to avoid injury. Thus, the ratio slowly flipped toward more college pitchers getting selected.

3. Increased signing bonuses. When the Kansas City A's made Rick Monday the first No. 1 pick in 1965, they gave him a signing bonus of $104,000 -- actually far less than the $205,000 the Angels had given Wisconsin outfielder Rick Reichardt the year before. Bonus payments remained relatively stagnant for 20-plus year after that. In 1987, top pick Ken Griffey Jr. received $160,000 to sign. It's perhaps no coincidence that as bonus payments began escalating in the early '90s, the quality of high school first-round pitchers improved. Where before kids committed to college, the million-dollar bonuses provided more incentive to enter pro ball right out of high school.

4. Protecting young arms. This is arguably the biggest reason high school pitchers now fare better. Organizations are more careful with high school pitchers than they were in the 1960s, '70s and '80s and even into the mid-'90s, limiting innings and enforcing strict pitch counts in the minors. Some point to the heavy minor league workloads and subsequent arm injuries suffered by the Mets' trio of Paul Wilson, Bill Pulsipher and Jason Isringhausen in the '90s as a turning point in how prospects are protected; some point to Kerry Wood and Mark Prior, although their injuries occurred after reaching the majors. In truth, it's been a slow evolution over the past 20 years, from better medical treatment, better coaching and, yes, limiting pitch counts.

5. Better scouting. The top-rated kids get exposed to better competition now via showcase events, summer teams and so on. A kid in the 1970s may have played only against weak local competition. So scouts see pitchers performing against better hitters, maybe see their ability to adjust or throw more secondary pitches. It has to make the process evaluating 17- or 18-year-old kids a little easier. And, more simply, maybe scouts just do a better job now. "Moneyball" pokes fun at the "good face" anecdote old-time scouts used to judge, but it's also true that scouts did use that assessment at times. The days of situations like the Minnesota Twins drafting a high school outfielder named Kevin Brandt -- who would play just 47 professional games -- with the 11th overall pick because he impressed them during a batting practice session are long gone.

Now, all this doesn't mean drafting high school pitchers doesn't come without risk. After all, in that 2002 draft Greinke was drafted sixth, Hamels 17th and Cain 25th. Drafted third, fourth and fifth were three guys named Chris Gruler, Adam Loewen and Clint Everts.

Three high school pitchers.

Follow David Schoenfield on Twitter @dschoenfield.

Are we in a golden age for catchers? In the wake of the Carlos Santana contract extension, there was some debate on where he ranks among the game's elite backstops. My colleague Eric Karabell called him the best catcher in the game.

I'm not sure Santana is in that class yet, although his power/walks combo could make him one of the most valuable players in the game even if he hits just .260. What makes that declaration difficult to make is we have so many good catchers right now. In 2011, we had six that posted a 3.5 WAR or higher (via Baseball-Reference.com):

Mike Napoli, Rangers: 5.5
Alex Avila, Tigers: 5.4
Miguel Montero, Diamondbacks: 4.5
Matt Wieters, Orioles: 4.0
Yadier Molina, Cardinals: 3.9
Carlos Santana, Indians: 3.9

And that list doesn't include six-time All-Star Brian McCann (2.5 WAR), Nationals rookie Wilson Ramos (2.5) or Joe Mauer and Buster Posey, who battled injuries. On top of that are promising Royals youngster Salvador Perez, who will miss the first half of the season with a torn meniscus in his knee; plus Reds rookie Devin Mesoraco and Blue Jays prospect Travis d'Arnaud, two of Keith Law's top 10 prospects entering the season. What's even more remarkable about this list is Napoli is the oldest of the 13 at 30 years old.

Is this much catching talent unusual? I looked at all seasons since 1969 with at least six catchers who posted 3.5 WAR or better.


I think there's an argument that we have the most catching depth in the majors since the late '70s. Looking at the 1977 guys, Ferguson, Tenace and Munson were the oldest of the group, each 30. Ferguson was a guy who had been a backup catcher/outfielder with the Dodgers but got a chance to play more for the Astros in '77. He was never a full-time player again. Munson declined precipitously in 1978 before his early death in 1979. Johnny Bench was only 29 but only had a couple more good seasons left. Of the younger guys, Gary Carter, of course, developed into a Hall of Famer catcher, but the Mets' John Stearns (25 years old) and Butch Wynegar (21) never really grew from here. Stearns battled injuries and Wynegar's skill set never advanced beyond a guy who would take some walks. (Jon Shepherd of the Camden Depot blog looked at the number of 125 OPS+ seasons by catchers by decade.)

Still, you have an impressive group for 1977: Three Hall of Famers in Carlton Fisk, Bench and Carter; a borderline Hall of Famer in Ted Simmons; Gene Tenace, a Santana-like player who drew a ton of walks and hit home runs; a former MVP winner in Munson; and a longtime defensive ace in Jim Sundberg, comparable to Yadier Molina.

Unless Mauer bounces back or one of the younger guys turns into a superstar, our current crop may lack the top-end caliber of Fisk, Bench and Carter. But the depth is phenomenal, and the youth means these guys are going to around a long time. Enjoy them. It's a special group.

Follow David Schoenfield on Twitter @dschoenfield.

Paul Konerko has aged extraordinarily well for a player generally viewed as a slow, unathletic first baseman. He is slow although he was athletic enough to spend time in the minor leagues as a catcher and he did play a few games at third base early in his career. But he arguably had the two best seasons of his career in 2010 and 2011 at age 34 and 35, something you rarely see from players of his type, who often wash out around his age. It's a testament to his work ethic and willingness to make some adjustments as he's aged.

I was surprised, however, to see that Konerko's career Baseball-Reference WAR is just 25.9. With 396 home runs, he's about to become the 48th player with 400 career home runs. Here are the lowest WAR totals for members of that club:

Dave Kingman, 442 home runs: 18.0 WAR
Juan Gonzalez, 434 home runs: 33.5 WAR
Jose Canseco, 462 home runs: 41.8 WAR
Carlos Delgado, 473 home runs: 44.2 WAR

So why is Konerko's WAR so low? After all, he has a career .282/.358/.500 line and Kingman was a notorious hacker and legendarily inept defensive player. A few reasons why:

1. Some of his early years came when other first basemen were putting up monster numbers. For example, in 2001 he hit .282/.349/.507 with 32 home runs. Nice season, no? But his OPS ranked just 15th among MLB first basemen. In 2004, he hit .277/.359/.535 with 41 home runs. Pretty good numbers. He still ranked just eighth among first basemen in OPS. That affects his WAR, in which value is compared to others at your position.

2. On-base percentage. While Konerko has consistently put up good home run and RBI totals, his OBP has fluctuated from as low as .305 in 2003 while generally hovering around .350. He's reached a .375 OBP just four times. Compare that total to some of his contemporaries: Todd Helton (11), Jeff Bagwell (11), John Olerud (9), Jim Thome (8, not including DH years), Fred McGriff (8), Jason Giambi (7), Carlos Delgado (7), Rafael Palmeiro (7).

3. Ballpark effects. The Cell has been a better-than-average park for hitters during his tenure. The runs he's created are less "valuable" because they've come in a higher run-scoring environment.

3. Defense. He's rated as a poor defender at minus-3.1 WAR.

4. Baserunning. Since he became a regular in 1999, the only players with more runs below average on the basepaths are Jorge Posada, Bengie Molina, Prince Fielder and Ramon Hernandez. Konerko is your ultimate station-to-station baseclogger.

White Sox fans will view this assessment as a little harsh on Konerko's abilities. Hey, he's been a good player, at times an excellent player, so I'm not trying to rip the guy. When you hit 400 home runs you've obviously done something impressive with your career. As 2012 kicks off, he's an interesting guy to watch. If the White Sox have any chance of contending, Konerko has to keep defying Father Time. (You can follow the White Sox all season on ESPNChicago.com's White Sox blog.)

Follow David Schoenfield on Twitter @dschoenfield.

The Blue Jays have scorched their opponents in spring training, winning 23 of 29 games and outscoring their opponents by 77 runs. Jayson Stark has a story up suggesting you shouldn't ignore the Jays, pointing out that in the past 20 years only two other teams have won 75 percent of their games in spring training -- the 1997 Marlins (who won the World Series) and the 2009 Angels (who won 97 games and reached the ALCS).

Can we read anything into a hot spring training at a team level? After all, while we're constantly told that "spring training doesn't mean anything," there's also a lot of cyberspace real estate being spent on spring training updates, reports, analysis and Twitter commentary that suggests it has to mean something.

Let's check back on 10 years of spring training standings to see if we can arrive at any broad conclusions. We'll begin with the team that had the best spring training record each season:


Definitely some correlation here, although last year's Royals are a good reminder that a hot spring doesn't always lead to a successful regular season. If you remember, the Royals pounded the ball all spring -- Melky Cabrera hit .468, Kila Ka'aihue may have been the best hitter in spring training with a .397 average and seven home runs, Alicides Escobar hit five home runs, Mike Aviles hit .357.

What about the teams that ended up with the majors' best regular-season record? Here's how they did:


There's clearly a strong correlation here -- 13 of the 14 teams listed had a winning record in spring training. For what it's worth, here are possible playoff contenders who have had a bad spring: Philadelphia (12-16), Tampa Bay (9-16), Texas (12-17), Atlanta (10-17) and Cleveland (7-21).

I'm not sure we can place too much emphasis on those records, however. Here are poor spring training records for some teams that made the postseason in recent years:

2011 Diamondbacks: 12-25
2011 Rangers: 13-16
2010 Rangers: 10-19
2009 Dodgers: 15-22
2009 Phillies: 13-19
2008 Phillies: 12-18
2008 Red Sox: 8-13
2007 Phillies: 11-18

So as bad as Cleveland or Tampa Bay has looked, we can't write them off yet. (Although I'd like to reconsider my idea of picking Cleveland as an upset special to win the AL Central.)

On a related tangent, how did the majors' worst team fare during spring training?


Well, maybe no surprises here. Only one of worst teams managed to even finish .500. The Astros, everyone's pick as the worst team in 2012, are 14-16. The Pirates are 9-18. But the Twins, Mariners, Padres and A's all have winning spring records, which doesn't mean those teams will finish above .500 but at least suggests they won't be the worst team in baseball.

Finally, let's look at a surprise team from each season:


If the Blue Jays do contend for a playoff spot, they won't exactly fit the definition of a surprise team since they won 81 games in 2011 and 85 in 2010. They'd have to win in the upper 90s to have a win increase that matches the teams on this list. Though there is some correlation here to playing well in spring training, last year's Diamondbacks gave no indication they'd turn into a 90-win club.

So there you go, Pirates fans ... maybe there is still hope.

There are two questions regarding the Los Angeles Angels' experiment of moving first baseman Mark Trumbo to third base:

1. Will it work, in the basic sense of what is the likelihood Trumbo will be able to adequately handle the position?

2. Is it the right move to make?

Mind you: Trumbo played 624 games at first base and a handful in the outfield in the minor leagues, but none at third. Other than 23 innings in the outfield last season, all his action came at first base.

I did a little search on Baseball-Reference and checked all players since 1950 who had played at least 300 games at first base and third base. I picked what I thought would be a reasonable standard of playing time; if you played 300 games at third base, it means a manager was at least willing to live with you out there for a couple seasons' worth of games. This would help narrow down players who had played both positions and highlight guys who may have made the first-to-third transition. I figured it would be a large list. After all, a lot of third basemen get shifted to first base, right?

There were only 24 such players. The list: Harmon Killebrew, Deron Johnson, Joe Torre, Dick Allen, Richie Hebner, Pete Rose, Tony Perez, Enos Cabell, Ray Knight, Bob Horner, Darrell Evans, Pedro Guerrero, George Brett, Jeff King, Dave Magadan, Ron Coomer, Todd Zeile, Phil Nevin, Shea Hillenbrand, Kevin Youkilis, Jim Thome, Aubrey Huff, Wes Helms, Miguel Cabrera.

You know how many of those 24 converted from first base to third base? One.

Nearly all of these guys came up playing primarily third base in the minors. Now, not all began their careers in the majors at third base. Ron Coomer, for example, played primarily first base his first couple of seasons with the Twins, but he'd come up through the Dodgers system as a third baseman. Joe Torre and Todd Zeile converted from catcher. Dick Allen played second base and outfield in the minors before moving to third base as a rookie. Tony Perez was like Coomer: Came up as a third baseman but played first his first couple years before moving to third base for a few seasons. Pete Rose, of course, played second base and outfield before moving to third base as a 34-year-old and later to first base. It's safe to say that few major league players have had the drive and baseball discipline of Rose. Pedro Guerrero? He was sort of a man without a position. He played outfield, third and first in the minors, so wasn't completely new to the position when Tommy Lasorda tried that misguided experiment.

That leaves us with Enos Cabell, our only true first-to-third conversion on the list. He came up through the Orioles system as a first baseman, playing 418 games there, 55 in the outfield and 11 at third base. He was traded to the Astros for Lee May where he played mostly outfield his first season but did start 19 games at third. He then moved to third base regularly in 1976 and remained there for five seasons.

That's it. One guy.

I cut the list down to 200 games at each position and we get to 43 guys. Again, mostly guys who came up as third basemen plus utility types like Mark Loretta and Ty Wigginton. Dan Driessen sort of qualifies, but he had played 43 games at third base in the minors in 1972 before his rookie season. Sparky Anderson tried to turn Driessen into a third baseman, starting him 85 games there in '73 and 122 in '74. It didn't stick. That's how Rose ended up there in 1975.

Now it's possible I may have missed a guy who played one year at first base and then moved permanently to third, and thus missing our 300- or 200-game cutoff. But you get the idea: This kind move rarely works. Trumbo was an excellent defensive first baseman. He's also a very large dude: 6-foot-4, 225 pounds. Immediately, you have to wonder about his range and quickness, although Angels fans will surely point out that Troy Glaus fared fine at the hot corner despite his similar size. In the limited spring training sample size of 60 innings, Trumbo has made three errors for an .833 fielding percentage.

So there have to be doubts about the move working, no matter Trumbo's work ethic or willingness.

Now, about the second question: Is Trumbo's bat worth getting in the lineup?

This is the part of the equation that many are ignoring. While Trumbo hit 29 home runs as a rookie he also posted a .291 OBP. Alberto Callaspo can't match that power but did post a .366 OBP. That 75-point gap in OBP looms larger than the 23-homer gap between the two players.

Trumbo created about 71 runs in 573 plate appearances. Callaspo created about 68 runs in 536 plate appearances. In terms of runs created per 27 outs, Callaspo had the better figure -- 5.22 runs per 27 outs versus Trumbo's 4.47. View it this a way: A lineup of 2011 Mark Trumbos would hit a lot of home runs ... but a lot of solo home runs. The lineup of 2011 Alberto Callaspos would score more runs due to its ability to get on base and sustain rallies.

Factor in the defensive spread between the two and there are obvious reasons to question the move -- not that it isn't wise to improve the versatility of your lineup. Now, there is a caveat worth mentioning. Callaspo may not be as good as he was in 2011 and Trumbo may improve his on-base skills. If that OBP gap narrows, Trumbo's power edge makes him a better offensive player.

That's the risk Mike Scioscia is taking if Trumbo becomes the team's regular third baseman. In the end, I suspect Trumbo becomes more of a utility guy: 40 games at third base, 30 games at DH, 20 games at first base when Albert Pujols rests or DHs and maybe a few games in the outfield. That can be a nice guy to have on a club.

Marc Topkin of the Tampa Bay Times wrote an article discussing Jeremy Hellickson and the conundrum he faces going into the 2012 season: Will he be able to avoid BABIP regression?

For the uninitiated, BABIP stands for Batting Average on Balls In Play. It is exactly as the name implies: A metric that tells you the rate at which batted balls resulted in hits (not including home runs). This intentionally ignores the two biggest events a pitcher has a lot of control over, walks and strikeouts. Studies have shown that unlike walks and strikeouts, pitchers have very little control over the conversion of batted balls into outs. Instead, that is reliant on the pitcher's defense, park factors and plain old-fashioned luck.

Per Baseball-Reference.com, Jeremy Hellickson posted a .224 BABIP last season, the lowest average allowed among starting pitchers and just one of seven starters below .260. "I hear it; it's funny," Hellickson told Topkin. "I thought that's what we're supposed to do, let them put it in play and get outs. So I don't really understand that. When you have a great defense, why not let them do their job? I'm not really a strikeout pitcher; I just get weak contact and let our defense play."

Pitchers, however, tend to regress back to around .300 the next season, no matter how high or low they fall in any given year. For example, since 1996, 19 starting pitchers posted a BABIP between .200 and .250. In the following season, 18 of those 19 regressed towards .300, between 23 and 89 points worse. Only one, Barry Zito in 2002-03, avoided regression.

The following table illustrates the issue more concisely.


This is not to say that Hellickson cannot improve in other areas. Every projection system listed on FanGraphs (Steamer, Bill James, RotoChamp, Marcel, and ZiPS) has him improving his strikeout rate per nine innings from his 5.6 mark. Bill James is the most optimistic, putting him at 7.8 while ZiPS and Steamer are more realistic at 6.7 and 6.3, respectively. Striking out an additional two hitters per nine innings means two fewer balls are being put in play in that span of time. Over 189 innings, that is 42 fewer balls in play. With a .300 BABIP, that amounts to 13 fewer hits, between five and 10 percent of a pitcher's total over a full season.

Furthermore, while most of the projections have Hellickson staying relatively static with his walk rate, Steamer is the only one that projects him to increase, rather than decrease, in that area. For example, Marcel -- the baseline for all projection systems -- has him going from 3.4 walks per nine innings to under 3.2. In terms of total walks, the decline is 72 to 67. The value of a walk is roughly 0.7 runs relative to an out, so five fewer walks results in 3.5 fewer runs. No, that is not the most significant change in the world, but several of these small improvements will help Hellickson recapture anything lost in his likely BABIP regression.

On the other hand, Hellickson very well could be the next Matt Cain, for all we know. Cain has been notoriously hard to account for using defense-independent measures, as his career BABIP is .269. Last year, I studied Cain in an article for Baseball Prospectus. I concluded his consistent BABIP-defying abilities were due to three factors:

• His spacious home ballpark.
• Significantly above-average infield defense, especially in the range department.
• A legitimate ability to induce weak pop-ups and opposite-field outfield fly balls due to his fastball.

According to StatCorner.com, Tropicana Field is pitcher-friendly, similar to AT&T Park. Left-handers hit home runs in Tampa at a rate 18 percent below the league average while right-handers were one percent under the league average. As Hellickson is right-handed, limiting the damage of lefties is key. Although he performed much worse against lefties in terms of strikeouts and walks, he allowed home runs at equivalent totals (11 to left-handers, 10 to right-handers).

Additionally, the Rays were the best defensive club in baseball according to almost every metric. The Fielding Bible projects the Rays to again be the best defensive team in baseball in 2012.

Finally, Hellickson did show the propensity to induce weak contact. Hitters put the ball in the air at a 45 percent rate, which included 16 percent that stayed in the infield. His infield pop-up rate was second-best in baseball, tied with Shaun Marcum and just 0.5 percent behind Ted Lilly. Lilly and Marcum posted a .260 and .261 BABIP, respectively. That duo has also posted a significantly below-average BABIP over the span of their careers, .274 and .270 respectively.

Hellickson shouldn't become the next J.A. Happ -- a pitcher who achieved early success and quickly flamed out due to an unsustainable BABIP correcting itself. Yes, the BABIP should correct itself in 2012 and beyond, but Hellickson will also take strides in areas he has control over, such as strikeouts, walks, and inducing weak fly balls. If you are a Rays fan, or a fantasy owner looking to get a bargain, be bullish on Jeremy Hellickson.

Bill Baer is the creator of Crashburn Alley, the SweetSpot network's Phillies blog. You can follow him on Twitter @CrashburnAlley.

One of the most important things Bill James learned when he wrote his "Baseball Abstract" books back in the 1980s was that the aging curve for ballplayers was much different than commonly believed. A player’s peak didn’t run from 28 to 32, but more like 25 to 29, with 27 being the most typical peak season for ballplayers.

This doesn’t mean old teams can’t win. In fact, many of the best teams feature old lineups for fairly obvious reasons if you think about it: Old players are still around (for the most part) because they were good or great young players. Like a pitcher who throws in the upper 90s before losing velocity, great young players can lose a little value and still maintain success. The 2009 Yankees had five regulars who were at least 33 years old -- Alex Rodriguez, Derek Jeter, Johnny Damon, Hideki Matsui and Jorge Posada -- and while none were at their peak level of ability they were still good enough to help that team win 103 games and the World Series.

But there's a fine line in the aging process. It's one thing to have A-Rod or Albert Pujols in their mid-30s; but what if your old players are, say, Marco Scutaro, Casey Blake and Michael Cuddyer?

Before we get to the Colorado Rockies, let's do a quick study. I looked at all playoff teams over the past five seasons to see how many plate appearances they received from players 32 or older (not including pitchers). By the way, when we refer to a player's age, it's his age as of June 30 of that season.

For those 40 playoff teams, the average number of plate appearances was 1,711. Here are the 10 oldest playoff teams by this method (remember, we're only looking at position players):

Some of these teams are warning signs about what can go wrong with an old team: the 2008 Cubs and White Sox haven't sniffed the playoffs since; the Giants brought back many of their veterans from their World Series champs and paid the price as Aubrey Huff, Andres Torres and Freddy Sanchez (plus new addition Miguel Tejada) all failed to replicate their performances; the 2009 Red Sox made the playoffs but fell off in 2010 as the lineup scored 54 fewer runs (the pitching allowed only eight more runs); the Angels scored 872 runs in 2009 but were down to 667 by 2011, in part because of the declines of Torii Hunter and Bobby Abreu and the addition of ineffective 32-year-old Vernon Wells.

Even the 2011 Phillies are an interesting example. The Phillies have won the past five NL East titles. Interestingly, that first team in their run in 2007 had the fewest plate appearances from players 32 or older of the 40 playoff teams:

That 2007 team scored 892 runs. As the Phillies stuck with that core group and the players started getting into their 30s, guess what happened -- their runs scored have dropped to 820 in 2009 to 772 in 2010 and to 713 in 2011. Of course, the Phillies have been able to balance that out by bringing in pitchers like Roy Halladay, Cliff Lee and Roy Oswalt. You can also now add Ryan Howard to the age-32 classification for 2012 and we already know he's going to miss a significant chunk of time. Will the Phillies score even 700 runs this season?

And that gets us back to the Rockies. In addition to the 38-year-old Todd Helton, they've added 38-year-old third baseman Blake, 36-year-old catcher Ramon Hernandez, 36-year-old second baseman Scutaro and 33-year-old outfielder Cuddyer. All of those guys have been good players, even as recently as last season. And while Helton was once a superstar, his back problems have helped limit him to an average of 11 home runs over the past four seasons. So my point: This group isn't exactly starting out from the same aging curve as Rodriguez and Jeter or Chase Utley and Jimmy Rollins or even Hunter or Bobby Abreu.

It's a potential recipe for disaster. The Rockies are expecting close to 3,000 plate appearances from those five guys. Maybe it will happen, but I don't see. There's no precedent over the past five seasons for a lineup with that construction making the playoffs.

And the Rockies don't have three guys named Halladay, Lee and Hamels in the rotation.

With all of this talking about production up the middle or at the four corners over the past 25 years, it might also be helpful to put this into perspective by asking: Who’s average?

Here again, I’m indebted to Clay Davenport’s work in creating Equivalent Average, as useful a tool for all-time performance on offense today as it was in the ’90s. Sticking with the 2011 and following Clay’s advice to cheat up a couple of points -- to avoid the impact of the real scrubs -- let’s look at who set the bar for mediocrity at all eight regular positions in the field:

Catcher: Rod Barajas, .258 Equivalent Average (EqA). Sure, he struggles to get on base, but Barajas’ modest pop at the plate -- delivering a .200 ISO last season -- and solid receiving skills makes him the acme of average from the backstop bin. In Pittsburgh, he might help propel their latest bid for a .500 season.
Runner-up: The Brewers’ Jonathan Lucroy, .254 EqA.

First Base: Freddie Freeman, .286 EqA. This might seem like an indictment of the Atlanta Braves’ prodigy, but the standards for offense at first base are higher than at any position, and this isn’t a shabby place to start for a kid in his age-21 season.
Runner-up: The Marlins’ Gaby Sanchez, .284 EqA.

Second Base: Orlando Hudson, .268 EqA. Hudson’s power has taken a hit the last two years since going to slugger-sapping Target Field and now the Padres’ Petco Park, but he still provides average offense for the position and above-average glove work, so he’ll keep landing gigs.
Runner-up: The Mets’ Justin Turner, .263 EqA, and an excellent example of how GMs can still find plug-in players on the waiver wire.

Third Base: One of the funny things about the field is that you’d be hard-pressed to find a truly average regular at third, but the closest might be Casey Blake with the Dodgers (.268 EqA) or Jack Hannahan with the Indians (.263), so let’s call it a platoon and punt on picking a runner-up.

Shortstop: Clint Barmes, .257 EqA. Here we have another Pirates offseason acquisition, which might be taken as proof that average is the new up, or that it takes a certain kind of player to choose to go to Pittsburgh. But more fundamentally, Barmes reflects today’s higher standard for adequacy on offense at short, because beyond premium defense he ripped a dozen homers for the Astros.
Runner-up: The White Sox’s Alexei Ramirez, .256 EqA, and another example after knocking 15 homers of his own.

Left Field: Cody Ross, .273 EqA. In contrast, here’s a great example of the declining standard for what gets by in left. The hero of the postseason in 2010 went back to his more mortal form at the plate with the Giants, and looks like he’ll be shunted into a part-time role with the Red Sox, splitting time in right field or spotting for the injured Carl Crawford in left early on.
Runner-up: Jason Bay, .270 EqA, and a symbol of the Mets’ bang-less bucks at work.

Center Field: Adam Jones, .273 EqA. Here’s a reflection on what a difference a position makes. Cody Ross? Not in high demand. Adam Jones of the Orioles? He’s a star, and somebody many teams would love to trade for.
Runner-up: The Diamondbacks’ Chris Young, .270 EqA. Keep in mind, Equivalent Average is park-adjusted, so all that slugging the Snakes get from their center fielder at home -- including 14 of his 20 homers, with a 131-point difference between his home and road SLG.

Right Field: Seth Smith, .283 EqA. Right’s the premium offensive position in the outfield these days, so the standard for average is going to be a bit higher. It says something about the Athletics’ lot on offense that they traded for Smith and fell he’ll provide a big boost with his bat from either corner.
Runner-up: Jeff Francoeur, .279 EqA. His comeback with the Royals was nice to see, but it’s a reflection of the depths he plummeted to during his three years in the wilderness that he’s gone from awful to average, not awesome.

Christina Kahrl covers baseball for ESPN.com. You can follow her on Twitter.

As we discussed in the first installment yesterday, performance at different positions invariably moves around a bit from year to year, but what about at the skill positions up the middle?

It seems as if not a winter goes by when you won’t wind up reading stories about the shortage of good catching (followed by the arrival of Koyie Hill on your team’s roster), or how landing people who can contribute at shortstop in the major leagues is difficult.

It’s sort of nonsense, because when you get right down to it, the standards for offense at catcher are stronger now than they were when we had just 26 or 28 teams. The amount of offense you can expect from your shortstops relative to league offense is higher now than it was in the glory days of the shortstop trinity of the ’90s, when Nomar Garciaparra, Derek Jeter and Alex Rodriguez seemed to redefine offense from a position where Barry Larkin and Cal Ripken had been the standard.

But at the same time, we’re seeing players like Robinson Cano and Dustin Pedroia rank among the best players in baseball at second base, while Jacoby Ellsbury and Matt Kemp might have deserved their leagues’ respective MVP awards for their seasons in center.

First, let’s start with the performance levels from second base, shortstop, catcher and center field, from 1987-2011, using Clay Davenport’s Equivalent Average as our rough year-to-year guide. As noted before, .260 is the single-season baseline for the major leagues.

Straightaway, you can see how on one level the skill position versus corner position distinction comes across as a bit arbitrary, because it’s clear that center field isn’t like the other skill positions. Indeed, last year it ranked as the third-most productive position, behind first base and right field. With that in mind, what does this mean?

Center field is strong, but not that strong. Historically, center fielders have always delivered more at the plate than all of the other up-the-middle slots, and also more than third basemen have in the past 25 years, averaging .269 over that time to the .267 teams have gotten from the hot corner.

What’s unusual these days is that center fielders did more good on offense in 2011 than third basemen and left fielders, something fairly rare. The last time anything like that happened was in 1984 -- a year when center fielders led both leagues in homers, Tony Armas winning the AL crown outright with 43 bombs for Boston, while Dale Murphy tied Mike Schmidt with 36 in the NL. But that was also a season when both leagues boasted a half-dozen really good players in center.

However, the standards for excellence in center field were higher, much higher, in the late ’60s and early ’70s, and were of course higher in the ’50s, when Mickey Mantle, Willie Mays, Duke Snider and Larry Doby ruled the middle pasture. In 1954, center field was baseball’s premium offensive position, with a .287 EqA. So, not to knock Kemp or Ellsbury, or Curtis Granderson and Andrew McCutchen, but as good as they are, this isn’t a new golden age for center fielders.

Second base has passed third base. I got into this a bit yesterday, and this might be considered a transient phenomenon, because it has been historically. However, do you really want to bet against Cano, Pedroia and Ian Kinsler? What if Jemile Weeks and Dustin Ackley break out as sophomores? What if Dan Uggla, Kelly Johnson and Aaron Hill all have great bounce-back seasons? What if Rickie Weeks and Chase Utley were healthy all year? But that last point is part of the problem for sustained greatness at the keystone: It’s a physically demanding position, and being a great player for any length of time at second base requires a huge element of skill and a little bit of luck when it comes to staying healthy.

Now, if they all come through, then sure, we could see a multiyear run for second base to wind up as a bigger impact offensive position than third base. But I’ll believe it after we see it.

Who needs the Trinity at short? The offensive standard for short has been higher over the past decade than it ever was at any point since division play started back in 1969. Remember, that’s despite four rounds of expansion.

Looking back, what really made Jeter and A-Rod and Nomar stand out, as Larkin and Trammell or Ripken and Robin Yount had stood out, was that they were pretty much alone. That’s because there were superstars and then there was a lot of reason to love Omar Vizquel or Edgar Renteria, because things got ugly fast. You don’t really want to remember Neifi Perez, do you? Desi Relaford? I’ve probably brought up Rey Ordonez one time too often for polite conversation.

Today, you still have the lamentably necessary guys like Yuniesky Betancourt or Ronny Cedeno, or Alcides Escobar’s on-the-job education in the major leagues, but if these represent the worst, they’re better than the bottom of the heap that existed in the past. The floor has come up, and we still have the true superstars, like Troy Tulowitzki and Jose Reyes. Let’s revel in their time, and also remember the Trinity, Ripken and Larkin as fondly as they deserve.

Catcher’s deep, still. Or, consider this another reason to not pardon the Angels for handicapping themselves with Jeff Mathis all these years, because there’s a difference between respecting a good receiver and ignoring his other responsibilities to playing baseball. (While we’re at it, there’s even less excuse for Drew Butera.)

Admittedly, being able to get Mike Napoli away from that kind of decision making and putting him in Texas is one way to improve matters. But keep in mind, with Victor Martinez moving out from behind the plate while Buster Posey and Joe Mauer missed big chunks of the season, catchers overall did a better job of contributing on offense in 2011 than they had in any year since 1997, so the overall depth behind the plate looks pretty good.

As you’ll notice from the chart, there’s been a lot of zigzagging around in catcher performance; it often drops behind shortstop, but sometimes tops it, and these days the two positions are running in tandem. Folks might still swear by Johnny Bench, but here again, we’ve got a lot of legitimate star-level talent out there; not just Posey and Mauer and Napoli, but also Brian McCann, Alex Avila, Miguel Montero, Carlos Santana and Yadier Molina. Then you can add in the durable catch-and-throw guys from the Jim Sundberg set, useful contributors at the plate and good receivers behind it: Carlos Ruiz, Matt Wieters, Russell Martin, and even Kurt Suzuki.

Put all of that together, and while we haven’t punched up this generation’s reputations with any special mystique, they can let their production be our guide. This may well be the deepest generation of catching talent in the history of the game, and there’s more coming, even with prospects like Wil Myers and Jesus Montero moving out from behind the dish. We still haven’t seen Jarrod Saltalamacchia really bust out. Austin Romine, Wilin Rosario, Derek Norris and Tony Sanchez are all on the way. If you love catching, you should love the present.

Tomorrow, to wrap things up we’ll have some fun talking about who best represents an average player at their respective positions.

Christina Kahrl covers baseball for ESPN.com. You can follow her on Twitter.

Are first basemen doing more to put runs on the board today than they did 10 years ago? How about 25 years ago? How do you make broad comparisons like this?

With any question like this you can get hung up on the differences between eras. Run-scoring environments are going to bounce around as a matter of course, and that’s before you get into the bump of the so-called "Steroids Era." If you were a fan just getting started in the late ’90s, chances are you might wind up with an inflated sense of what player performance is supposed to look like.

Happily, you can compare player performance within the context of their own season. Clay Davenport, an old colleague from Baseball Prospectus, cranks this data for every season. We can get a snapshot of where performance has gone at each position by using his Equivalent Average, or EqA. Equivalent Average isn’t the only stat you can employ; Clay scales production to batting average, with .260 defined as average.

With that in mind, let’s take a look at performances from the eight major positions over the past 25 years. We’ll start with the premium offensive positions, the four corners, from 1987 to the present:



Keep in mind, .260 is average for every season, so the year-to-year variations are going to refer back to that baseline. We can already draw a few broad conclusions -- some of which are pretty much accepted wisdom, but some prove slightly surprising.

Runs come from first base. This might seem obvious, but that’s especially the case now. It hasn’t always been that way. As you can see from the chart, left and right fielders have sometimes approached the first basemen, but that usually coincides with bad years for first basemen. But these days, first base is the game’s premium offense position.

If you look back further, that picture gets a lot more complicated. During the ’70s, first, right and left were equally important offensive positions, and in 1982 the four corners and center field were separated by just eight points. That changed in the late ’80s, as the standard for production at first base now winds up north of a .280 EqA year after year.

This higher standard has survived two expansions and the steroid era. This year Mark Teixeira was below average despite hitting 39 homers. Admittedly, it was a down year for him: he posted a .281 EqA compared to an MLB average of .283. In contrast, in 1991 Carlos Quintana defined adequacy at first -- if you’re from outside Boston and have forgotten him entirely, it’s probably just as well, but he was a nice OBP guy without much power.

What does that mean today? Well, this goes a little bit towards what Dave Schoenfield was writing about as far as Albert Pujols ranking as the top player in the game for so long. It also means that while teams like the Rangers have been leaving runs on the table by playing Mitch Moreland, you can understand why the Red Sox traded for Adrian Gonzalez while the Angels landed Pujols. Credit the Rays for keeping up with the other big-money contenders by bringing Carlos Pena back (.292 last year).

Right field is where outfield stars play. This might take us back to the days of Babe Ruth or Hank Aaron as opposed to Ted Williams or Barry Bonds. While the averages for the two positions have balanced out over time, right field is the much stronger position these days. Some of that has is because of a matter of preference: Lance Berkman played right for the Cardinals not because he’s a good right fielder, but because he’d help them score a ton of runs. Jose Bautista might be a fantasy league’s perfect third baseman, but the Blue Jays keep bumping him back to the outfield. Add in breakthrough seasons for Mike Stanton and Matt Joyce and even nice bounce-backs from Justin Upton and Jeff Francoeur, and you wind up with the game’s reigning premium outfield slot.

Left field is down. Way down. As you can see, the last 25 years have been pretty up and down for the left-side corners. The average for left fielders in the era of division play is .277, but they haven’t reached that mark since 2004.

The sad state of left-field offensive production has already been debated plenty among statheads. Is it an affordable risk on offense at a time when teams are more defense-conscious than ever before? Or is it a case of reaping what you sow when you make a point putting guys like Juan Pierre in your everyday lineup? It might reflect an industry-wide choice to employ better defenders at the position, sacrificing some offense. But in other ways it might also reflect how left field has become almost a garbage-time position for teams that stow their backup center fielder or a sputtering veteran holdover. Teams now lack the roster space to platoon or mix and match on offense the way that they could before the seven-man bullpen became fashionable.

Whatever your take, offensive production from left fielders is down at its lowest point in 25 years, matching 1997 for punchlessness with a .268 EqA. That isn’t a coincidence; much like the present, 1997 featured a lot of transition in left fields around the majors, with guys like Gregg Jefferies, Wil Cordero and B.J. Surhoff playing their first full seasons in the outfield. Moises Alou got hurt (again), Bernard Gilkey’s career started imploding, and Greg Vaughn and Ron Gant had the worst years of their careers.

Fast-forward to the present, and you find your share of setback seasons (Carl Crawford and Delmon Young). You also see a lot of flat-out awful from self-inflicted bad ideas, like Raul Ibanez in the last year of his contract while Vernon Wells, Carlos Lee and Alfonso Soriano marked time on huge deals that won’t go away soon enough.

Against that, you’ve got the guys we might call sops to the speed-and-defense crowd, or what I think of as the next-gen Dave Collins solutions: Brett Gardner, Jose Tabata, Michael Brantley, Sam Fuld, Pierre and more. They range from useful OBP sources to significantly less so, but not one of them is going to be Tim Raines, let alone Crawford. Last year Gerardo Parra had the best season among this group (.280 EqA); he also stands to lose playing time in 2012 to Jason Kubel, a guy who’s a much more conventional corner-outfield selection.

Third Base is hurting. If you’re a student of baseball history, you already know that back in the Deadball Era second base was more of a high-offense position than the hot corner. That changed in the 1920s with the introduction of the livelier ball, but every once in a while you get a year where you’ve got a great group of second baseman and a weak crew of third-base vets. That was very much the case in the late ’80 and early ’90s (thanks in part to guys like Roberto Alomar, Ryne Sandberg, Robby Thompson, Lou Whitaker and Julio Franco), but after the Marlins-Rockies expansion in ’93 second base fell back again. But now we’re at this same point again, where third base has slipped behind second base, if only barely (.262 EqA to .261).

With the declining standards reflected by Scott Rolen getting named to an All-Star team despite a lousy season, finding merely competent options for third base isn’t as easy as it sounds. Alex Rodriguez and Chipper Jones certainly aren’t getting any younger.

You can hope this will change for the better with the arrivals of touted prospects like Brett Lawrie, Mike Moustakas and Lonnie Chisenhall, but we’ve also seen a few major third-base prospect flops: Pedro Alvarez or Andy LaRoche, anyone? That’s why journeymen like Casey Blake, Ryan Roberts or Jack Hannahan get opportunities to stick around.

If anything, the state of third base these days speaks volumes about the Tigers' decision to move Miguel Cabrera across to the diamond after signing Prince Fielder. As Mark Simon notes, the defensive penalty might be steep, but reviewing this data suggests that there's a major competitive advantage to be gained relative to the competition, because they're making room for two superstar bats in the lineup: Cabrera with his career .315 EqA, and Fielder with his .313. The Cardinals just ran up a flag after risking their defense at the corners with Berkman in right, so you can't blame the Tigers for trying to do likewise.

Tomorrow, we’ll look at the up-the-middle positions. If you’re one of those people who think finding good help at shortstop or catcher is hard to find these days, you might have a surprise to look forward to.

Christina Kahrl covers baseball for ESPN.com. You can follow her on Twitter.

Fill in the blank: Curt Schilling was to his era what _____ was to his era.

The answer that best supports Schilling’s Hall of Fame candidacy is to say “Bob Gibson.” Take a look at the chart on the right. That runs through the basic statistical gamut, when it comes to looking at the two side by side. The key stat is their ERA+.



ERA+ is a stat found on Baseball-Reference.com, designed for cross-era comparison. I feel comfortable in using these stats because I know they’re the kind that Schilling likes. He devised one similar to ERA+ on his blog and used it on Baseball Tonight.

ERA+ rates a pitcher’s ERA relative to his peers at the time, making slight adjustments based on the difficulty of pitching in the various ballparks of the era. It allows us to compare Gibson’s 2.91 to Schilling’s 3.46 on an even playing field, since Schilling pitched in an era that was more offensively friendly. Gibson is a 128 ERA+. That’s elite. It's tied for 13th-best among those who threw at least 2,000 innings since 1920 (or, the Live Ball Era).

It’s the same ERA+ as Tom Seaver. It's better than that of Jim Palmer, Juan Marichal, Warren Spahn. Bert Blyleven, and plenty of other Hall of Famers. And it’s the same ERA+ as Schilling.

In fairness, Gibson put together his ERA+ by averaging 258 innings per season over a 15-year period. Schilling reached that number of innings only three times in his career. But for those who say that Schilling was not quite the workhorse that Gibson was, consider that each was a product of the baseball environment of the times.

Again, relative to their peers, the two were virtually equal. Gibson finished in the top 10 in his league in innings pitched eight times. Schilling finished in the top 10 in his league in innings pitched seven times. There’s a similarity when it comes to awards voting as well. Each of them got Cy Young votes in four different seasons. Gibson won it twice (and won an MVP award in 1968); Schilling finished second three times.

Where the Gibson-Schilling comparison best comes across is in the postseason. In my father’s era, Gibson and Sandy Koufax were the standard-setters for postseason pitchers. In my era (the last 30 years), with apologies to John Smoltz, Schilling is the standard-setter.



Gibson was 7-2, all in the World Series, with a 1.89 ERA in nine starts. Schilling played in an era with a different postseason format, but he was 11-2 with a 2.23 postseason ERA in 19 starts. As noted in that chart, he was 4-1 with a 2.06 ERA in seven World Series starts.

Again it’s a neat comparison to look across the eras. In the stretch in which Gibson pitched in the postseason (1964 to 1968), all of the other pitchers to pitch in the World Series had an ERA of 3.43. Schilling’s World Series ERA is a little higher than Gibson’s, but again, consider the time period. From 1993 to 2007 (Schilling pitched in the World Series in 1993, 2001, 2004, and 2007), all pitchers other than Schilling combined for a World Series ERA of 4.04.

That’s not to say that Schilling was the better postseason pitcher, statistically speaking. Gibson won a pair of Game 7s and had six out of nine World Series starts that tallied an 80 or better by Bill James Game Score, including an epic 17-strikeout start in Game 1 of the 1968 World Series. Schilling has three of his seven World Series starts that rate a 74 or better, with his “epic” being the 147-pitch shutout in Game 5 of the 1993 World Series.

The point isn’t that Schilling is better than Gibson. By this standard, he isn’t. The point is that Schilling was the Gibson of his time. Since 1969 (the year after Gibson made his last World Series starts), Schilling has those three World Series starts of 74 or better. No one else has as many (for the record, Tom Glavine is the only pitcher since then with a pair of 80s or better, but this piece isn’t about him).

I’m not going to pretend that this is the perfect comparison. As my father pointed out, Gibson won with a combination of power and intimidation. Hitters feared facing him. But what Gibson had in fear factor, Schilling had in another area -- precision. He had the second-best strikeout-to walk rate in major league history.

This is not meant to be an advertisement for Schilling’s Hall of Fame candidacy. Nor is it meant to establish who was the better pitcher. We go back to the original fill-in-the-blank, and it will be interesting to see what happens when the Hall of Fame ballots are cast in 2013. Gibson was elected on the first ballot. Schilling … we’ll have to wait and see.

The most interesting pitch to dissect from the 2011 season is the 1-2 pitch that Texas Rangers closer Neftali Feliz threw to David Freese with two on, two outs and the Rangers leading the St. Louis Cardinals 7-5 in Game 6 of the World Series.

The image above shows the location of that pitch -- a 98 mph fastball on the outer third of the plate. Our department has a pitch-by-pitch database, with which we can look at every pitch thrown to an approximate location. This isn’t perfect science, given the imperfections of the Pitch F/X system, but it’s the best we can do at the moment.

In replicating this situation -- a two-strike pitch to a right-handed hitter in which Feliz threw a fastball -- we found six pitches, prior to the one to Freese, thrown to that approximate spot. Three of the pitches were fouled away. The other three were at-bat enders.

On May 7, the Rangers led the Yankees by the same 7-5 score with two outs in the ninth inning. Feliz had a little bit of breathing room in that one, with no one on base. He threw a 96 mph fastball that Derek Jeter grounded harmlessly to short for the final out in a Rangers win.

In June, he got Jason Bourgeois of the Houston Astros to ground out to second base; in July, he got Josh Willingham, then of the Oakland Athletics, to fly out to left center. Additionally, on June 12, 2010, Feliz gave up a pair of hits to Jonathan Lucroy and Rickie Weeks of the Milwaukee Brewers on 1-2 counts.

Since then, he had thrown 84 pitches on a 1-2 count to a right-handed hitter. He allowed a man to reach base on only one of those pitches, when he hit Allen Craig with a 1-2 curveball three days prior. He got 36 batters out (two hit into double plays) with those 84 pitches and allowed no hits. Of those 36, 16 struck out, most recently Austin Jackson, who swung through a 101 mph 1-2 fastball in Game 1 of the ALCS.

On this occasion, Freese would make contact. As it had been for Freese during the postseason, it was very solid contact. By our research, and again this is very unscientific, it was the second time he made contact against a two-strike fastball thrown to that spot by a righty (he also grounded out to first base against the Brewers in April 2010).

That brings us to the second aspect of the play.

The ball took off on a path between a line drive and fly ball to right field. It had a velocity of 101.4 mph and reached an apex of 60 feet; I’m told neither number rates particularly high. It hung in the air for four seconds. And it stayed in the ballpark, and that gave Rangers right fielder Nelson Cruz a shot at catching it.

What was Cruz’s chance of catching that ball? That’s a great question, and while we can’t answer it exactly, we can touch on a few pertinent pieces of information related to it.

Cruz rated above-average via BIS's Plus-Minus metric, at catching balls hit to the deepest part of right field. Over the previous three seasons, Cruz saved his team 29 bases on balls hit to the deepest parts of ballparks, though in 2011, he was only a plus-three. There was a time in his career in which Cruz had difficulties with right-field walls. BIS has logged 12 instances since 2009 in which Cruz either went back to the fence, and missed a ball that rolled past him, or had other wall-related issues trying to make a catch. However, only one of them came in the 2011 season.

Twice in the postseason, Cruz made a catch going back on a ball hit to deep right field, once against Brandon Inge in Game 6 of the ALCS, and then again against Albert Pujols in Game 2 of the World Series.

In this instance, Cruz reached for the ball. He came very close to it but missed. Two runs scored. Game tied. A few hours later, the series was tied. A day later, the Cardinals were celebrating a championship.

It was one pitch that made the difference between baseball jubilation and baseball devastation. One pitch with all sorts of fascinating intrigue.

Context or quantity, what’s your preference? That’s the question that requires answering when trying to select which player had the Defensive Game of the Year in 2011.

It struck me that it would be an interesting project to try to determine the game in which a player did the most with the glove. Baseball Info Solutions charts every play of every game, tagging the best plays into 30 categories of Good Fielding Plays (GFPs). They denote the plays for which you’d likely put a star on your scorecard and keep a running count throughout the season.

Using a combination of their lists and anecdotal recall, I was able to come up with about 30 nominees. These were either players who made at least three out-producing GFPs in a game or made multiple plays of great significance to the ultimate outcome of the game.

After reviewing video for each candidate, it came down to two choices, and that’s where the context versus quantity debate comes into play.

My pick for the Defensive Game of the Year by a player goes to Brent Lillibridge of the White Sox. This selection is one that will be worthy of debate. Consider this: Lillibridge only played two innings in his game and handled two chances, but he made the biggest impact of anyone on the field.

On April 26 against the Yankees, Lillibridge’s team was down 2-1 in the eighth inning when Lillibridge was inserted as a pinch-runner for Carlos Quentin. Paul Konerko, and then homered off Rafael Soriano to put the White Sox up, 3-2.

Lillibridge wouldn’t get any action as Quentin’s replacement in right field in the eighth, but he became the game’s focal point in the ninth inning. The Yankees put two men on with one out for Alex Rodriguez. On a 2-1 count, Rodriguez hit a line drive towards the right-field fence.

Lillibridge, who was playing deep, sprinted back, reached out and made the catch, his glove parallel to the ground, his left leg up in the air as he leaned into the wall. That play got a “Mercy!” from Ken Harrelson, a hands-on-helmet gasp from Rodriguez and a smile from the runner retreating to second, Derek Jeter.

The second catch came two pitches later on Robinson Cano’s sinking line drive to right. This one required a quick sprint toward the line and a full-length dive.

Lillibridge’s glove hit the ground with the baseball with his body fully extended in the air. Cano’s helmet went flying in frustration as Lillibridge slammed the grass with his right hand and let out a yell in celebration.

We wrote about the difficulty of these plays earlier in the season. The second play had a 95 percent chance of being a hit, according to the research done by Baseball Info Solutions. That, combined with the win probability value of the two plays, which took the White Sox chances of winning from 65 percent to 100 percent, made this the choice to be the top honor.

Lillibridge had 12 GFPs in his 339 2/3 innings in the outfield, a pretty good innings-to-play rate. Lillibridge had six Good Plays in just over 200 innings in right field, the most by anyone who didn’t get charged with any Defensive Misplays & Errors (the opposite of GFPs). He had a penchant for great late-game glovework, preserving a 1-0 shutout for Jake Peavy with a tough catch in left-center in the eighth inning of one win, and robbing Coco Crisp of a go-ahead two-run home run in the eighth inning of another.

There is a worthy runner-up for Game of the Year from an unlikely source. In a 9-1 loss to the Rangers on September 14, Cleveland Indians left fielder Shelley Duncan made four fabulous plays on would-be base hits. The amazing thing was that three of them came in a row, for the last two outs of the first inning and the first out of the second inning, each by the 19-foot-high fence in left field.

On the first, Duncan tracked the ball off Elvis Andrus’ bat a little oddly, twisting his body to left center, before stopping and turning back to leap and make the catch right by the wall. The next two looked a little more natural. Both were similar in nature, requiring a full extension in the air with his glove hand, and in the same location, just in front of the last set of games listed on the out-of-town scoreboard.

The image atop this article shows the catch that ended the first inning, against Josh Hamilton, and has a little bit of a “look what I’ve got” quality to it.

The fourth catch came in the fourth inning and required Duncan to come toward the line, come in, and backhand the ball as he slid on the grass. It ended up being overshadowed because the Rangers ended up scoring eight times in the inning. Baseball Info Solutions didn’t award Duncan a GFP for the first catch, but did give him one for each of those last three.

This was about as unlikely a combination of Web Gem-worthiness as you could imagine. In 248 other innings in left field over the rest of the season, Duncan only had one other GFP.

In the end, I selected Lillibridge over Duncan because I wanted to reward the game-saving nature of his plays. Lillibridge's plays were the difference between winning and losing, and their value trumped any others that came along the rest of the season. But before you have at debating this selection and the idea of “clutch defense” in the comments section, here’s a list of some of the other notable contenders, with links to the video so you can check them out for yourself.

Honorable Mentions

Sam Fuld, Tampa Bay Rays

The Rays' version of Superman had a pair of games that merit mention. On May 7 against the Baltimore Orioles, Fuld made a diving catch in the fourth inning, then went to the left-field fence to rob Matt Wieters of a home run with a leaping catch in the eighth inning.

Then, on June 19 against the Florida Marlins, Fuld took away a pair of hits, one a line drive in the corner by Omar Infante that likely would have been a double, then came in to shallow left to dive and pick a ball off just before it hit dirt. That preserved a 1-1 eighth-inning tie in a game in which the Rays would score in the home half to win, 2-1.

Also among the best performances by an outfielder were Diamondbacks centerfielder Chris Young (three tough catches in Wrigley Field on April 6), and Astros right fielder Jason Michaels (three catches against the Braves on June 12).

Cody Ransom, Arizona Diamondbacks

Ransom, a Mesa, Arizona native, hit only .152 in 12 games and 33 at-bats for his hometown team but made one of his nine starts count on both the offensive and defensive end.

Ransom’s seventh-inning two-run home run off Clayton Kershaw made the difference in a 4-3 win that kept the Diamondbacks a half-game back of the Giants in the NL West, but that’s not why he’s on this list.

Ransom made three fine defensive plays, twice going to his right to make difficult plays, then making a nice long throw on Juan Rivera’s ground ball for the final out of the game.

Other infielders worthy of notice were Orioles first baseman Chris Davis (three terrific plays on August 12), Phillies second baseman Chase Utley (four hit robberies vs the Cardinals on June 23), Rays second baseman Ben Zobrist (six GFPs against the Mariners on August 21), Cardinals shortstop Rafael Furcal (six GFPs against the Brewers on August 31), and Rockies third baseman Chris Nelson (three fine plays against the Cardinals on August 12).

While doing research for today’s piece on Ron Roenicke, a few fun items came my way that weren’t Brewers- or postseason-centric. Thanks to Doug Kern and the gang at Stats & Info, I was given a leaderboard for which position players have been bunting the most, how many of them have led to base hits, and even who has the most sac bunt RBIs this season.

Keep in mind, this is sorted by bunt attempts, not successful sac bunts, so the nine guys who have attempted to bunt the most often are not always the same guys who lead the league in successful sac hits.

The other thing to remember is that the tally of plate appearances where a hitter has laid one down include bunting for base hits and bunting to advance runners, so when you see that Juan Pierre’s 16-for-32, that means he has 16 bunt singles, but doesn’t necessarily mean he was trying to bunt for a hit 32 times. And because this was fairly quick and dirty, we didn’t tease out ROE results. However gritty the info, it’s interesting for the sense it gives us of which players are dropping one down most frequently, and what this also tells us about the managers they play for.

Looking at the top nine of baseball’s bunting fiends, we lead off with the White Sox’s Pierre, just like they do. Looking at these totals, he’s clearly the class of the little man’s game when it comes to placing pitches up the lines and around the mound. It has always been a centerpiece of his game, with the attending results in base hits, runs driven in and what some refer to as productive outs.

It’s worth noting that Pierre doesn’t just lead all position players in sac bunts, but all the pitchers as well. You can take that as a reminder of one of those pesky facts that NL-brand fans don’t often care to cite -- that you’ll usually find AL managers bunting more often with the people who can actually hit for a living, and not just with pitchers because what else can you do with them? This year’s team that has gotten the most sac bunts from its hitters? Ned Yost’s Royals squad. Between his fellow former Brewer Alcides Escobar (with a remarkable 17 sacrifices in 21 attempts) and Getz, it’s enough to make you wonder if Yost misses managing in Milwaukee.

Between Pierre and Getz you’ve got a group of guys who actively attempt to bunt for base hits: The Marlins’ Emilio Bonifacio and the Angels’ infield assault duo of Eric Aybar and Peter Bourjos. You can probably also put the token Twin on the list, Alexi Casilla, in this category as well. Ron Gardenhire might not have Nick Punto, and whatever value designated bench bunter Matt Tolbert has seems to have dried up after 2009, but Gardenhire's past fascination with the bunt still found an outlet with Casilla this season.

The pair of playoff-bound bunters should get some additional attention, despite the tactic’s associations with White Sox and Royals and Twins. The Yankees’ Gardner isn’t just an OBP hero and everybody’s favorite underrated Yankee (if that isn’t automatically oxymoronic), he’s also someone equally adept at pushing bunts for base hits or to move runners up. That’s something he has in common with Rangers speedster Elvis Andrus; if you remember the impact Andrus had within last year’s ALCS on both sides of the ball, this is just one piece of his value as far as being able to push sac bunts and base hits and exploit his speed to good effect.

For the curious, the best bunting pitchers in terms of raw numbers are the Phillies’ Roy Halladay and the Nats’ Livan Hernandez. Where Doc’s really only had two years to work on his craft, he’s already come fairly far as a pitcher capable of helping his own cause, ripping his first two career extra-base hits when he isn’t laying one down. Livan owns a career .528 OPS as a hitter (probably good enough to put him in the Twins’ infield), but bunting’s just another component in his batsmanship.

Christina Kahrl covers baseball for ESPN.com. You can follow her on Twitter.