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So, Thomas Neumann of Page 2 sent me this picture of a Sports Illustrated cover, listing all the millionaire players from 1985. I think Thomas was working on a career retrospective of John Denny or something, I'm not sure. (OK, he actually interviewed Mike Schmidt.) Anyway, it got me thinking: What if we compare the highest-paid players from 1985 to the highest-paid players of 2011 ... and find out if teams are smarter than they were in 1985. After all, front offices know much more than they used to, right? With all the advanced metrics out there, all the Ivy League dudes making the decisions and so on, you'd expect smarter moves being made by front offices.

Let's take the top 25 players from that 1985 cover, the top 25 highest-paid players of 2011 and check their Wins Above Replacement level (WAR) from Baseball-Reference.com. For 2011, we'll using their current WAR prorated to the entire season.

1985 Top 25 Highest-Paid Players
1. Mike Schmidt ($2.1M): 5.3 WAR
2. Jim Rice ($2.1M): 1.1 WAR
3. George Foster ($1.9M): 1.5 WAR
4. Dave Winfield ($1.7M): 2.8 WAR
5. Gary Carter ($1.7M): 6.7 WAR
6. Dale Murphy ($1.6M): 5.3 WAR
7. Bob Horner ($1.5M): 1.8 WAR
8. Rickey Henderson ($1.5M): 10.0 WAR
9. Eddie Murray ($1.4M): 6.0 WAR
10. Bruce Sutter ($1.3M): -0.1 WAR
11. Ozzie Smith ($1.3M): 5.7 WAR
12. Jack Clark ($1.3M): 3.3 WAR
13. Robin Yount ($1.3M): 1.7 WAR
14. Pedro Guerrero ($1.3M): 7.8 WAR
15. Rick Sucliffe ($1.3M): 2.8 WAR
16. Fernando Valenzuela ($1.2M): 5.6 WAR
17. Goose Gossage ($1.2M): 2.6 WAR
18. Tim Raines ($1.2M): 7.5 WAR
19. Steve Kemp ($1.2M): -0.2 WAR
20. Steve Carlton ($1.2M): 1.2 WAR
21. Andre Dawson ($1.1M): 2.0 WAR
22. Keith Hernandez ($1.1M): 4.9 WAR
23. Mario Soto ($1.1M): 3.6 WAR
24. Andre Thornton ($1.1M): 0.0 WAR
25. Fred Lynn ($1.1M): 2.0 WAR

Total salary: $34.8 million.
Total major payroll in 1985: About $264.7 million.
Percentage of total payroll: 13.1 percent.
Total WAR: 90.9.

2011 Top 25 Highest-Paid Players
1. Alex Rodriguez ($32.0M): 5.3 WAR
2. Vernon Wells ($26.2M): -1.4 WAR
3. CC Sabathia ($24.3M): 4.6 WAR
4. Mark Teixeira ($23.1M): 3.9 WAR
5. Joe Mauer ($23.0M): -0.5 WAR
6. Johan Santana ($21.6M): Injured
7. Todd Helton ($20.3M): 3.9 WAR
8. Miguel Cabrera ($20.0M): 6.7 WAR
9. Roy Halladay ($20.0M): 9.2 WAR
10. Ryan Howard ($20.0M): 2.5 WAR
11. Carlos Beltran ($19.3M): 5.1 WAR
12. Carlos Lee ($19.0M): 3.0 WAR
13. Alfonso Soriano ($19.0M): 1.2 WAR
14. Carlos Zambrano ($18.9M): 2.8 WAR
15. Torii Hunter ($18.5M): -0.7 WAR
16. Barry Zito ($18.5M): -0.5 WAR
17. Jason Bay ($18.1M): 0.0 WAR
18. Ichiro Suzuki ($18.0M): 0.5 WAR
19. Josh Beckett ($17.0M): 9.2 WAR
20. A.J. Burnett ($16.5M): 2.3 WAR
21. Matt Holliday ($16.3M): 5.1 WAR
22. Michael Young ($16.1M): 1.8 WAR
23. Roy Oswalt ($16.0M): 3.7 WAR
24. Jake Peavy ($16.0M): 0.7 WAR
25. John Lackey ($15.9M): -2.5 WAR

Total salary: $493.6 million.
Total major payroll in 2011: About $2.786 billion.
Percentage of total payroll: 17.7 percent.
Total prorated WAR: 65.9.

FINAL ANALYSIS

Major league owners in 2011 are paying a higher percentage of their total payroll to the top 25 players and receiving far less production. Even if you account for better seasons the rest of the way from the likes of Joe Mauer and Ichiro Suzuki and Torii Hunter and John Lackey, the 2011 group wouldn't come close to matching the 1985 group in total WAR.

What's amazing is to look at the 2011 list and realize how many of those guys were never superstar players: Vernon Wells? Carlos Lee? Torii Hunter? Michael Young? A.J. Burnett? Barry Zito? Please. Good players at one point, never superstars.

Another way to look at it: Of the top 25 position players in B-R's WAR in 2011, only ONE (Miguel Cabrera) is one of the top-25 highest-paid players. In 1985, nine of the top 25 position players were among the 25 highest-paid players.

Also, in 2011, 10 of the top-25 highest-paid players are pitchers -- who inherently are more risky. Of those 11, five have spent time on the DL this season.

So, nice job major league owners and general managers! You're collectively, umm ... well, let's just say that Vernon Wells isn't worth $26.2 million.

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If the American League has very few stable platoons but a few identifiable platoon players getting work, is the National League any better off? Even with today’s bigger bullpens, the absence of a DH gives NL skippers and GMs a little more freedom to carry a player whose primary value is to platoon, since they have five reserves, so even if one is a catcher and another is someone who can play short, that still leaves space for the odd guy. Say, that journeyman who can knock a situational lefty right out of the box, or who can help put up a crooked number against that tiring right-handed starter in the fifth or sixth inning. And it doesn’t hurt that these kinds of guys are handy for double-switches.

As in the American League, you find a few catching platoons of convenience, in which the backup backstop bats from the other side and conveniently gets his starts on the days the starter needs a rest. The Braves’ setup with Brian McCann and David Ross is the best of the lot, but when Atlanta afforded itself Ross, it did so knowing it was getting more than a platoon player. The Mets’ young/old and lefty/righty combo of Josh Thole and Ronny Paulino has its virtues. Charlie Manuel has the benefit of a slight inversion of the paradigm when Brian Schneider is healthy -- a lefty-batting backup is a lot easier to spot when Carlos Ruiz really does need a rest, since most pitching is right-handed -- but he’s on the DL.

Stable platoons beyond those behind home plate are surprisingly limited in the Senior Circuit. I’d divide the current group of platoons in the league into three groups: committed, accidental and diffident, reflecting the level of planning and commitment that went into constructing them, and whether or not they’re going to last more than a couple weeks.

Among the few we’d call committed, Clint Hurdle’s stolidly running out his right-field combo of Garrett Jones and Matt Diaz. It isn’t hitting all that well, but that was the plan, and so far, they’re sticking with it. The Phillies anticipated a right-field platoon before the season, but Domonic Brown’s injury kept that from becoming a reliable feature of Manuel’s lineup cards until recently, pressing Ben Francisco back into an everyday role he handed back.

In the infield, San Diego manager Bud Black has been reliably sticking with Brad Hawpe and Jorge Cantu as his first-base arrangement, but there’s only so much Can’tu at the plate that even the Padres can endure. The rare multi-position platoon that’s a matter of design, but also a certain diffidence is found in Houston, where Brad Mills is moving Carlos Lee between left and first base, but not every time out. Brett Wallace sits against a few lefties, Jason Michaels plays left and Lee moves to first and keeps getting to play every day. The ‘Stros might have a 10-8 record vs. lefties, but getting Michaels into the lineup isn’t the reason why. But re-potting the increasingly immobile Lee someplace other than left field might be a contributing factor.

Alone among their NL brethren, the Marlins have stuck with an infield platoon someplace other than first base, and they platoon at third without actually finding a set right-handed half of the platoon. Edwin Rodriguez has damned the defensive torpedoes to run Greg Dobbs out there every day against right-handers, while leaving his partner du jour as a matter of mystery -- sometimes it’s Wes Helms, sometimes it was Donnie Murphy, and now sometimes it’s the roving Emilio Bonifacio. Those happy few who root for the Teal Deal are no doubt on their seat’s edge when their Fish face a lefty.

Among the accidental platoons, three NL West teams have setups they didn’t necessarily expect. To the credit of both Bruce Bochy and Black, they’ve proven reliably willing to platoon, and they’re assembling new ones on the fly after their initial designs broke down. Black got plenty of mileage out of his outfield platooning last year, but Will Venable flopped this spring, handing back his half of the right-field job. In his desperation, Black is pairing Eric Patterson with Chris Denorfia, which isn’t helping matters.

While Bochy isn’t trying anything quite as inspired as last year’s mid-season lineup platoon between Travis Ishikawa and Aaron Rowand -- with Aubrey Huff moving to the outfield against righties and returning to first base against lefties -- he has been aggressive in getting Nate Schierholtz into the lineup against right-handers while playing Cody Ross daily. Rowand is getting platoon time with Andres Torres in center, but Pat Burrell hasn’t been entirely reduced to Schierholtz’s platoon partner.

Then their is the Dodgers’ Don Mattingly. Some combination involving Jay Gibbons in left field was probably going to be part of the program at the outset, but Gibbons’ spotty health, a passing interest in Tony Gwynn’s speed, and Marcus Thames’ breakdown opened up an opportunity for first baseman Jerry Sands to win the job. But like so many other thundersticks from Albuquerque in Dodgers history, his stick fell still in Chavez Ravine, and now Sands is in an accidental platoon with Gibbons until they decide there’s a better alternative.

Injury created the Braves’ temporary replacement platoon setup for Jason Heyward, as the Eric Hinske/Joe Mather platoon is working out nicely -- but it’s also clear that pair will head back to pine time as soon as Heyward’s healthy. In contrast, some managers look like they’d like to platoon more, but injuries have gotten in the way. The Brewers’ Ron Roenicke appears committed to a Nyjer Morgan/Carlos Gomez platoon in center because of the speed ’n defense combo it provides, but Morgan’s injury got in the way at the outset. If it sticks, that’s the circuit’s lone platoon arrangement up the middle someplace other than catcher.

The Pirates’ loose platoon at the infield corners reflect what I mean by “diffident platooning.” In contrast with his greater faith in his right field platoon, at the infield corners Clint Hurdle’s sort of futzing around with Steven Pearce at both first and third vs. lefties to give him something to do, and sometimes Brandon Wood gets time at third. But it isn’t an everyday sort of devotion, and has as much to do with Pedro Alvarez’s career-stunting slow start and Lyle Overbay’s offensive indifference than any abiding faith in Pearce or Wood.

I’d also chuck Kirk Gibson’s first-base set-up into this category as well -- Xavier Nady and Juan Miranda are platooning, sort of, but Gibson isn’t exactly being a stickler about it. Since neither are hitting the people they’re supposed to, and since neither plays first base all that well, it’s more first base by coin toss at gunpoint than a straight platoon.

Platooning isn't automatically a good idea, after all, and if as Casey Stengel put it, "I could'na dunnit widdout the players," that's just as true today -- skippers can only use what they've got, no matter how clever they might be in how they employ it.

Christina Kahrl covers baseball for ESPN.com. You can follow her on Twitter.

From 1979 through 2006, the Houston Astros were one of baseball's best and most consistent franchises. They suffered just six losing seasons and made the playoffs nine times. They finally reached their first World Series in 2005, but that was primarily an aging club at the end of a long run of success. Jeff Bagwell was done, Craig Biggio and Roger Clemens were old, Andy Pettitte would return to the Yankees and Morgan Ensberg never repeated his big season.

And the talent dried up. The Astros are on their way to their fourth losing season in five years and will likely lose more than 90 games for the first time since 1991. As Buster Olney wrote in his blog today, with Drayton McLane selling the team to Jim Crane, the new ownership group knows it has to pay more attention to player development.

1. A string of bad drafts. Former scouting director David Lakey nailed his first two first-round picks, drafting Lance Berkman in 1997 and Brad Lidge in 1998, but the Astros haven't drafted a first-rounder since who has developed into a solid major leaguer. (Time will tell, of course, on recent picks like Jordan Lyles and Delino DeShields Jr.) The Astros only had one top-10 pick from 1993 through 2007 (Chris Burke, 10th overall in 2001), which doesn't help, of course. The team also forfeited its first-round picks in 2003 (for signing Jeff Kent), 2004 (for signing Andy Pettitte) and 2007 (for signing Carlos Lee). It's hard to fault the Kent and Pettitte signings, but Lee has been both expensive and now unproductive.

Every team misfires in the draft but the Astros have had a long string of misfires. In 2005, under scouting director Paul Ricciarini, they were picking 24th and selected pitcher Brian Bogusevic, who was later converted to an outfielder. Matt Garza was the next pick and Colby Rasmus went later in the round. With the 23rd pick in 2006 they took high school catcher Max Sapp, who hit .224 in three seasons in the minors and then developed meningitis, which ended his career. Even before contracting meningitis, the Astros had shown their doubts about his future big-league status, drafting catcher Jason Castro in the first round in 2008. Two picks after Sapp, the Angels selected another high school catcher, Hank Conger, now playing well as a rookie. But the big blows were a string of drafts from 2000 onward that produced few big leaguers -- guys who should be in their primes right now.

2. McLane refused to spend on the draft, sticking to the MLB recommended slot bonuses. For example, the team failed to sign third-round pick Drew Stubbs in 2003; he later became a first-rounder of the Reds. Castro, drafted 10th overall in 2008, was taken one pick before Justin Smoak, whom most scouts rated much higher. Smoak signed for a bonus $1.5 million more than Castro.

McLane always operated the franchise like a mid-market team, instead of one playing in the sixth-largest metro market in the U.S. Under McLane, the Astros ranked in the top 10 in payroll in the majors just twice -- sixth in 2006 and eighth in 2009. Maybe there isn't quite enough fan interest in Houston to allow the Astros to play with the big boys -- even during their great run in the late '90s and early '00s, they reached a peak attendance level of fifth in the NL.

3. The Venezuelan pipeline shut down. Whether through deploying fewer resources, not spending money or just signing the wrong guys, a once fruitful operation in Venezuela -- arguably the best in the majors -- has returned little talent in recent years. Among the players Houston signed out of Venezuela: Richard Hidalgo, Bobby Abreu (although he was lost in the expansion draft), Carlos Guillen, Johan Santana (lost in the Rule 5 draft), Freddy Garcia and Melvin Mora.

4. Bad deals. The Carlos Lee -- six years for $100 million in 2007 -- was a bad deal at the time, an overrated RBI guy with mediocre OBPs who played poor defense. As predicted, it's become an albatross and he'll still be making $18.5 million in 2012. The team drafted Ben Zobrist and later traded him to Tampa Bay for Aubrey Huff. That's 68 games of Huff before he left as a free agent.

Crane will take over officially sometime this summer. He's got a lot of work ahead of him.

Follow David on Twitter: @dschoenfield. Follow the SweetSpot blog: @espn_sweet_spot. And follow the Astros blog here.

Joe Janish over at Red Leg Nation did a good job compiling the ZiPS Projections by Dan Szymborski to figure out the projected NL Central standings for 2011. I'm not going to give you a homerific projection of the Astros' season. I've got a pretty good record of being excessively critical of the Astros, and I'm certainly not turning around on that to say they're going to the World Series or anything absurd like that.

But don't you have to question the methodology of anything that places pretty much any team behind the Pirates?

The pessimist in me is perfectly willing to buy Szymborski's breakdown that compares the Astros to the Orioles in the way they keep getting just enough wins to convince management that the team doesn't need to go in a drastic new position. He's right that it's a slow downward spiral and I've been saying as much for years.

But, even granting that it is true, there are a number of reasons to think the Astros will not finish behind the Pirates.

First of all, the Astros have history on their side. In 17 years of sharing the division, the Astros have never finished behind the Pirates. They have had some scares in recent years, but the Astros never finished last in the division and have never finished behind the Pirates. History can change at any moment and that's the beauty of sports, but I'm looking at a Pirates team whose best full-time starter (Ross Ohlendorf) posted a 4.01 ERA last year, and I'm not seeing any reason to think the pattern of the Astros beating out the Pirates is going to change this year.

Secondly, the Astros' offense should get better this year. Nobody's going to confuse them with the 1927 Yankees or even the 2004 Astros, but there's plenty of reason to think the Astros will be better with the bats in 2011. They added Bill Hall and Clint Barmes. Chris Johnson will probably take a step back from his surprising rookie campaign, but there's no reason to think that Brett Wallace and Jason Castro won't see improvement, and no reason to think that Carlos Lee and Michael Bourn can't rebound and hit more like they did in 2009. They were a team in flux last year, and even with their complete offensive futility, I'll let you take a stab at one of the two teams that finished behind the Astros in virtually every offensive category. Did you guess? Yeah … it was the Pirates.

Thirdly, the Astros have pitching. You can knock their offense from here to October, and maybe their pitching even overperformed a little bit last year with a resurgent season from Brett Myers. But Myers, Wandy Rodriguez and J.A. Happ lead a solid rotation (3.30 ERA last year for those three) and the bullpen is coming together with great young guys like Fernando Abad, Wilton Lopez and Mark Melancon, with Brandon Lyon anchoring the closer's spot. Again, nothing that will compete for the World Series, but certainly good enough to finish ahead of the Pirates and maybe even enough to surprise other NL opponents.

I don't write this to proclaim the virtues of a team that might be just this much better than the lowly Pirates. I write it to say that this statistical finding doesn't pass the smell test. I'm sure that Dan Szymborski has put a lot of thought and work into his equations, but when those equations come out with the standings shown by Red Leg Nation, it might be an invitation back to the drawing board. Or, at the very least, a reminder that all the stats in the world will never tell us what we often know just by looking at what's in front of us.

Austin Swafford writes Austin's Astros 290 Blog, a blog about the Houston Astros. You can follow him on Twitter.

Carlos Lee is not at all the same player the Astros got when they signed him for the 2007 season. His slugging percentage dropped 80 points last season and is just .292 so far this season. He is a liability on the basepaths and had the lowest range factor of any starting left fielder last year. He has also hit into 21 double plays last year and is on pace for 30 this year. All of this comes in addition to hitting .200 this year with a .530 OPS. Lee is unlikely to magically improve at the age of 33.

The real problem is the contract. If Jeff Keppinger was hitting that way, he would be benched without hesitation. However, Lee is in the fourth year of a six year contract that is paying him $18.5 million each of the next three seasons. Not that most teams would take him, but it is worth mentioning Lee has a no-trade clause in his contract and does not seem interested in leaving Texas.

Houston is in a real bind. Who needs a declining outfielder in his mid-30s who can't play defense? The only teams that might take a chance on such a player -- the Royals and Nationals -- would surely be rejected by Lee. A handful of AL teams might take a chance on him as a DH, but it’s hard to say which might be suitable for Lee, and even harder to say Houston would get the kind of value they're looking for.

It’s the same issue Buster Olney wrote about last week with Lance Berkman and Roy Oswalt -- the Astros would probably have to eat a lot of Lee’s salary to get some good prospects, or hand his salary to the buyer and not get much talent in return.

The best thing the Astros have going for them is that they are clearly not going anywhere this year. The Astros have two outfielders who are posting very good numbers at Triple-A Round Rock. Brian Bogusevic has a .336/.397/.513 line with nine doubles, four homeruns and 17 RBIs. Jason Bourgeois is .316/.393/.411 with three doubles, two homeruns, 13 RBIs and 12 stolen bases. Both have some issues that probably prevent them from being ready right now. But perhaps they get up there and surprise. That's the nice thing about not having anything to lose -- you can see if these young guys have some real promise for the future.

Bourgeois, in particular, would provide a very nice complement to Michael Bourn, who is the only real speedster the Astros have right now.

It is time for the Astros to see about the future. They should release Cory Sullivan and make Lee the highest-paid pinch hitter in the game while they see if Bogusevic or Bourgeois has anything to offer. Maybe if Lee becomes dissatisfied enough on the bench and plays well during some DH opportunities in interleague play, he might reconsider accepting a trade.