TrueHoop: Jerome James
Is the cure worse than the disease?
US Presswire
Drew Gooden, left, and Eddy Curry are prime examples of bad contracts. Owners want shorter contracts, but that means more free agents every summer.
The basketball landscape is littered with symbols, but none more damning than the bad contract.
Rhetorically, there's a good reason for this. No matter how conscientiously you point out that bad contracts represent a small fraction of the whole, or that the volume of underpaid rookie-scale players and superstars far exceeds the number of bloated deals, the trump card is irrefutable:
"Jerome James," "Eddy Curry," "Gilbert Arenas," "Drew Gooden."
Bogeymen have always populated the political debate: the welfare recipient who drives a Cadillac. The failed CEO with his golden parachute. The undocumented immigrant who uses the emergency room and public school. The retailer who gouges a community after a natural disaster. The corporate jet owners who get tax breaks.
In that same spirit, basketball has James, Curry, Arenas, Gooden and the guy who slurped up your team's budget and then failed to live up to his contract. These players might be the far-reaching outliers, but they represent something fundamentally unfair to most fans:
Getting paid to do a job, then not doing it.
That transgression is particularly rotten when the job in question is playing a child's game, and this breach of public trust makes the overpaid player a very convenient talking point.
Of course, a bad contract doesn't birth itself. It starts off as an offer extended by a team soliciting the services of a player -- usually in free agency, sometimes as an extension of an existing deal. Either way, an NBA front office saw a vacant roster slot, thought enough of a player's potential to pursue him, then ultimately inked him to a lucrative deal. As much as we can fault the work ethic of someone who phones it in after signing such a deal, the job of vetting the character and projecting the performance of a player falls on team executives and the owners who employ them.
As much fun as it looks from the outside and the ranks of a fantasy league, general manager is a grueling, all-consuming, difficult position. The tenure of a general manager usually ends with a pink slip. Unless he's wearing a baseball cap in June standing alongside a star player who's lifting the Larry O'Brien Trophy, a GM's missteps always attract a brighter spotlight than the small victories. The chase for NBA talent is fraught with all kinds of hazards, and even the best human resource managers in the league are going to have an expensive blemish or two on their record.
For this reason, a push for shorter contracts has been a central part of the "system issues" conversation since well before the expiration of the previous collective bargaining agreement. Whether you interpret this as a means for bad teams to seek protection from themselves, a smart way to keep spending in check, or a way to prevent deadbeats from profiting without performing, reduced contract length is almost certain to find its way into the next CBA, whenever the deal happens to be executed.
In the owners' Nov. 11 proposal to the players' union, the length in contract of the mid-level exception signees for both taxpaying and non-taxpaying teams was reduced from five years to either four or three years. Maximum contract length for players with Bird rights was reduced from six years to five, and from five years to four for non-Bird players. In addition, option years for players earning greater than the league average were eliminated (which would effectively shorten contracts vis-a-vis the last CBA), as were sign-and-trade deals for taxpaying teams after Year 2 of contracts (ditto).
What are the repercussions of shorter contracts?
Shorter contracts mean more turnover, which means more free agency. And free agency, lest we forget, has always been the vehicle for the creation of bad contracts.
On the surface, this change would provide a modicum of safety for front offices and ownerships. Never again will a player like Gooden earn a mid-level deal of five years and $32 million. In the new NBA, the maximum a mid-level player could be offered would be 4 years and $20 million. Curry's 6-year, $60 million contract would also be an impossibility.
In other words, execs' colossal mistakes will be trimmed in scale by about 20 percent and their medium-size stupid pills would be reduced by 35 to 40 percent. Curry would've merely been a 5-year, $50 million blunder, while Milwaukee would be on the hook for one year and $12 million less, assuming the Bucks would've opted to use the mid-level on Gooden -- and that Gooden wouldn't have had suitor willing to pay him more.
General managers would be inoculated from truly epic failures, but they'll also be filling more roster spots, more often in more feverish free agent markets. Execs will have more opportunities to make more mistakes of, albeit, slightly less detrimental consequences. That means bad judgment could potentially be compounded in an off-season when a league has dozens of more roster spots to fill with free agents.
On the flip side, shorter contracts would punish crafty executives capable of locking in talent to favorable long-term contracts. With more roster slots to fill more frequently, smart execs will have more shot attempts to work their magic. In 2002, Joe Dumars signed Chauncey Billups to a 6-year, $34 million deal, possibly the best mid-level deal in history. In today's NBA, Dumars would be denied full reward for his prescience. The jury is still out on Wes Matthews in Portland, but his $7.2 million contract in the final year of his 5-year deal might prove to be a bargain. Under the new system, the Trail Blazers wouldn't enjoy the benefits of Matthews' potentially cost-efficient services.
In a league with shorter contracts and greater turnover, navigating the free agent market will be more important than ever. But if making sound judgments on extending free agent contracts is a task front offices as a whole have mismanaged -- by the league's own admission -- is it reasonable to expect that to change with even more opportunities for mistakes?
Matt McHale of By the Horns: "It's a bad sign when fans start longing for the halcyon days of the Michael Sweetney Era. And it's especially frustrating for Bulls fans, who had to deal with the loss of Ben Gordon while the league's rich got even richer: Boston got Rasheed Wallace, Cleveland got Shaq, L.A. got Ron Artest and San Antonio got Richard Jefferson ... It makes sense that the fans wanted to see a move. Something big, something juicy. But sometimes, staying the course might be the best plan of action. Or inaction, as the case may be. As things stand right now, the Bulls have a solid core of players -- a budding All-Star-in-the-making, a few savvy vets, some developing youngsters -- and enough expiring contracts to make a major move next summer or at the trade deadline. And Chicago will certainly be a much more attractive free agent destination if the Bulls can match last season's success than if they fell apart because [Carlos] Boozer took his usual 30-40 game vacation and our backcourt players broke down from playing too many minutes. Now, if the Jazz wanted to trade Boozer for some loose parts off the Bulls' scrap pile -- Tim Thomas, Jerome James, Anthony Roberson -- then let's get it done. And while we're dreaming, maybe they'll trade us Deron Williams for Brad Miller's expiring contract. But barring some mass hysteria and insanity in Utah, I guess Bulls fans will have to be satisfied with some incremental progress and hope for the future."
Zach McCann of Orlando Magic Daily: "The only real issue with signing Brandon Bass is that -- at least technically -- he plays the position where the Magic were the deepest before his arrival. Rashard Lewis and Ryan Anderson gave the Magic talent and depth at power forward, making it the only position with a legitimate starter and legitimate reserve (I'd count point guard as well, but that's arguable). When a team has eight players under contract, as the Magic did last week, an all-star and a promising rookie at one position feels like an overabundance of wealth. So, at the surface, bringing in another power forward doesn't make a whole lot of sense (especially a 6-foot-7 power forward who's seemingly too small to fill in as the team's primary backup center, even if the statistics say otherwise). But that doesn't mean it was a bad signing. I love the move - like most Magic fans do - especially for the relatively inexpensive price tag. For a 23-year-old who seeps potential and has already played meaningful minutes on an upper-echelon team, $18 million over four years is a great deal. Anytime you can attain a quality player for that kind of value, you do it."
Graydon Gordian of 48 Minutes of Hell: "I love watching [DeJuan] Blair work under the boards. He has a mature sense of spacing and soft, accurate hands. His rebounding was particularly notable on the offensive end, where he consistently turned misses by his teammates into open layups and trips to the line (where he went 5-6). As will be the case with during the regular season, Blair was by no means the tallest player on the floor. But he was the only player on either team whose rebounding count reached double digits. Blair's offensive contributions weren't limited to put-backs; he showed promising signs that a well-rounded offensive game may be in his future. On the first play we ran specifically to him, Blair turned and hit a smooth 12-footer. On the next play, he received the ball at almost the exact same spot and used his defenders over-adjustment to take him off the dribble and draw the foul. Blair's mechanics are a little loose, but the origins of a reliable offensive arsenal are there."
THE FINAL WORD
Raptors Republic: Jarrett Jack, stop-gap?
Cowbell Kingdom: The cap and the Kings.
Valley of the Suns: What to expect from the Suns this week in Las Vegas.
(Photos by Andrew D. Bernstein, Doug Pensinger, Noah Graham, Bill Baptist/NBAE via Getty Images)
What happened to the Magic's patented pick-and-roll? Their effective transition game? The sharpshooting from beyond the arc? Is it the Lakers' defensive pressure or has Orlando's inside-out offense gone off the rails?
Kurt Helin of Forum Blue & Gold: "The Orlando pick and roll is not really working all that well for them. As was noted before the series, a lot of times Orlando runs that just to try and get the defense scrambling, leading to an open three. But the Lakers are keeping their shape, defending that well. Not scrambling. (The threes Orlando got was because the Lakers decided to double Howard more in the third, which didn't work out.) ... Stan Van Gundy literally threw everything he could think of at the wall in game two -- he went big, he went without a point guard for the last nine minutes of the game, he hired a Shaman to curse the Lakers (okay, maybe not that). And he is 0-2. There are adjustments that Orlando can continue to make, but you get the feeling that they don't have a magic bullet here. They will not be swept as at least one game a few of those shots will fall and they will get some hometown calls. But do you really think they can win four out of five from the Lakers?"
Zach McCann of Orlando Magic Daily: "So far, the Lakers are outplaying, outcoaching and out-executing the Magic. They're forcing Dwight Howard to the baseline, where it's difficult to pass out of the double-team and their guards are slapping at the ball. They've all but shut down Orlando's transition game, staying disciplined with three defenders back at all times (which is part of the reason the Lakers grabbed only four offensive rebounds). They know the tendencies of [J.J.] Redick and [Rafer] Alston -- mainly, when they get in the lane they want to dish the ball instead of challenging a big man. The fact is, the Lakers did the bare minimum tonight to win. In the NBA Finals ... you don't worry about long-term tendencies, patterns or pace -- all that matters are wins and losses. The Magic need four of the former before they get two of the latter. Can they do it against this Lakers team? I don't know."
Graydon Gordian of 48 Minutes of Hell: "As a counterbalance to the realities of geography, the Spurs have systematically focused their attention on foreign prospects. I use the term systematically for a reason: I don't believe our history of intensely scouting international talent is just a tendency. I believe it is a conscious attempt by management to expand the team's media market. Consider this example: You are scouting two 21 year old small forwards, each with similar builds and similar abilities. One may be a slightly better defender than the other, one may knock down threes at a slightly higher clip, but for all intents and purposes they have the same style and talent. But one of these players is from Happy Valley, Australia while the other is from Carlsbad, California and attended the University of Arizona. Which player is more valuable to your franchise? It doesn't take much mental effort to recognize the hidden value of the Australian. The Spurs are not going to be adding a foothold amongst the basketball fans in Southern California or Arizona any time soon. By drafting the Australian you instantaneously reach out to untapped sources of fan support."
THE FINAL WORD
Celtics Hub: Was Boston's offense better this season without Kevin Garnett?
Daily Thunder: Building a winner for the long term.
Knickerblogger: Marcin Gortat -- no Jerome James.
(Photos by Jed Jacobsohn, Garrett Ellwood, D. Clarke Evans/NBAE via Getty Images)
Kurt Helin of Forum Blue & Gold: "The Rockets offense is about Yao Ming -- it is where their plays start, where they will need to get the majority of their offense ... The Lakers cannot just do one thing all series long against Yao -- he is too good and too smart for that. One thing the Lakers need to do is make him work for post position - but unlike [Greg] Oden doing it without fouling. Portland had some success fronting him in the post ... while earlier in the year the Lakers had success sending a slow double to the block (not when he first gets the ball but when he starts to make a move). The Lakers may even go with a little one-on-one -- although let's be clear, while we should expect more out of [Andrew] Bynum, expecting him to stop the best center on the planet one-on-one is asking too much of him. (And before you say Dwight Howard is the best center on the planet, look at his head-to-head with Yao.) The goal is to both Make Yao hesitate and make him think and pass out -- he is a smart player and in recent months he has become much better to passing out of the double, out of trouble. But that is still the preferred option."
Rob Mahoney of Two Man Game: "[Jason] Kidd has done plenty to validate his acquisition, but the heady floor general was actin' the fool during the most critical stretches of Game 1. I can confidently say that I've never seen so many poorly timed and poorly executed bounce passes from such a talented point guard, and Kidd made it easy for Denver's defense by bouncing the ball right into their laps. Obviously the Dallas brass didn't dream of Kidd double-dribbling away fast break opportunities or hurling passes out of bounds when they traded for him a year ago, but that's exactly what he was doing with the Mavs' most critical possessions. I can accept Kidd's weaknesses. I know he won't be an impact scorer, and I know that his defensive abilities are impacted by his age. But I'm not prepared for Kidd's strengths to suddenly disappear before our very eyes."
Mike Kurylo of Knickerblogger: "There's a problem with the league when fans can't analyze a trade without consulting an accountant ... The issue stems from guaranteed contracts, or more specifically bad contracts ... Falk suggests the owners will push for a hard cap and shorter contracts. And I hope they win, because the soft cap/guaranteed contract is bad for the league and its fans. Imagine if player deals were only guaranteed for the first 3 years. Almost instantly the Knicks could have jettisoned any unwanted players and reshape their team in a single offseason. On his first day Donnie Walsh could have cut Stephon Marbury, Zach Randolph, Eddy Curry, Jerome James, Jamal Crawford, and Malik Rose. With the players cut from other teams, Walsh could have had a wider berth of players to chose from when building the 2009 roster. Unfortunately the current cap rules forced Walsh to stick with these undesirable players and allowed him to trade them only for matching salaries ... It's easy to see why this would benefit teams and their fans. Bad franchises would be able to fix their mistakes quicker, which means fans wouldn't have to wait years for the hometown squad to turn things around. And since winning correlates to ticket sales more than anything else, it means the owners would see more money in their pockets."
THE FINAL WORD
Roundball Mining Company: No 'Melo, no Chauncey ... no problem.
Raptors Republic: "Ben Gordon is fool's gold."
By the Horns: The comedown.
(Photos by Lisa Blumenfeld, Ronald Martinez, Mike Stobe/NBAE via Getty Images)


