The Numbers

2001 record: 62-100, .383 (tied for 29th overall) 2001 expected record*: 60-102 Runs scored: 657, 15th in NL Runs allowed: 858, 15th in NL Run differential: -201 (29th overall) Starters' ERA: 5.29, 14th in NL Bullpen ERA: 4.59, 14th in NL Payroll (Opening Day): $52.7 million (19th overall) Local broadcast revenue: $9.1 million (25th overall) Attendance: 2.46 million (17th overall) 3-year record: 209-276, .431 (27th overall) 5-year record: 357-452, .441 (26th overall) * based on runs scored and runs allowed

2001 in review
What went right?
The Pirates new PNC Park was generally well received, and the team drew 2.5 million fans -- 700,000 more than in 2000. Aramis Ramirez had the breakout season all of us have been waiting for, and at just 23, should develop into a perennial All-Star. Brian Giles was his typical mighty self, and Craig Wilson slugged .589 in 158 at-bats. Oh, and on June 11th, the Pirates fired GM Cam Bonifay. Exponential addition by subtraction.

What went wrong
Free-agent signees Derek Bell (two years for $9 million) and Terry Mulholland proved to be monumental wastes of dough. The offense, beyond Ramirez, Giles and Wilson, was utterly inept -- the Pirates scored 657 runs, second-worst in the NL. Jason Kendall had a puzzlingly poor season, and once-promising youngsters Warren Morris and Chad Hermansen continued their downwhirl spirals toward permanent unemployment. The pitching staff? Ew. With Kris Benson and Francisco Cordova felled by injuries, Pittsburgh used 11 different starters to stop the bleeding. Didn't work. The Pirates as a team finished with an 5.05 ERA, second-worst in the NL. For all that, the Pirates lost a cool 100 games.

In retrospect, the critical decisions were:
1. Signing Derek Bell. Granted, Bell isn't as atrocious as his 2001 numbers suggest. Still, for a team that claims it's hampered by small-market realities, it's just plain stupid to sign a 31-year-old outfielder with a career .757 OPS to an above-market value contract. In fact, it'll get a GM fired in a hurry. Speaking of which ...

2. Firing Cam Bonifay, hiring Dave Littlefield. Bonifay was the anti-Billy Beane, a guy who had no clue how to run a franchise with limited resources. He left Littlefield with the majors' least-talented roster and most barren minor-league system. Simply put: Littlefield can't run this franchise any worse.

3. Let Aramis Ramirez play. You wonder how much more advanced Ramirez would be as a player if the Pirates, starting in 1998, rode out his early career struggles and just let him play. As it is, at just 23, he should give Adrian Beltre and Sean Burroughs a run for the title as the NL's best third baseman for a decade to come.

Looking ahead to 2002
Three key questions
1. Can Kris Benson pitch? Benson, who looked like ace material in 2000, is expected to return in May from a right elbow injury that cost him all of 2001. But as Matt Morris and Kerry Wood proved, it sometimes takes a year to get your swerve back.

2. Who else fills out the rotation? There are plenty of options, some of them even palatable. Kip Wells, acquired from the White Sox for right-hander Todd Ritchie, was much better out of the bullpen than as a starter last year, but the Pirates love his arm, and see him as a top-of-the rotation guy. Of course, they say the same thing about ERA machine Jimmy Anderson. Dave Williams, Tony McKnight and Branson Arroyo showed some promise in stints last season, while Sean Lowe and Josh Fogg should also enter the picture.

3. Where do Jason Kendall and Craig Wilson play? The Pirates need to leave Kendall alone and let him take his preferred place behind the plate (it's a lot easier to ride out a .689 OPS from your catcher than it is from your left fielder or second baseman). And Wilson, at the very least, should platoon with Kevin Young at first base and play a little outfield, when he's not spelling Kendall. This offense needs his stick.

Stats Corner
Kevin Young (above) was the second-highest paid Pirate in 2001 ($6.125 million), but Pittsburgh first basemen (mostly Young) ranked last in the NL with a .677 OPS. Pittsburgh shortstops (.576) and second basemen (.613) also ranked last. Aramis Ramirez loved the road: he hit .325 and slugged .584 vs. .275 and .487 marks at home. Jimmy Anderson (5.10 ERA) and Todd Ritchie (traded to White Sox) were the only two pitchers to throw more than 115 innings.

Can expect to play better
Kendall was once one of the game's top 20 players and is still only 27. Kevin Young, Derek Bell and Warren Morris simply can't be as bad as their 2001 numbers either. Pat Meares? OK, yes, he is that bad.

Can expect to play worse
Uh, geez. Who can play worse?

Projected lineup
CF Adrian Brown
C Jason Kendall
LF Brian Giles
3B Aramis Ramirez
1B Kevin Young / Craig Wilson
RF Derek Bell / Armando Rios
2B Out Machine TBD (Quilvio Veras got a spring-training invite. I might give him a shot.)
SS Jack Wilson

Rotation
Kip Wells
Jimmy Anderson
Dave Williams
Bronson Arroyo/Tony McKnight/Sean Lowe
Kris Benson (when he returns)

Closer
Mike Williams

A closer look
If for nothing else, give new GM Dave Littlefield an early "A" for attitude. Unlike other small-market general managers, including his predecessor, he's not playing the victim role or looking for excuses why his Pirates can't compete. He expects to win. Maybe not now. But soon.

But how? A positive attitude doesn't win games all by itself (If it did, manager Lloyd McClendon's shiny spring outlook in 2000 would have translated into more than 62 victories). You also need a meaningful, long-term game plan. Especially for a team that operates with budgetary constraints (or so the Pirates insist they must), you have to be cunning about how you allocate your resources, and how you invest and develop young talent.

The Oakland A's are obviously the model small-market franchise. They don't throw money at replaceable veterans under the misguided notion that you need experience to win. They heavily invest in scouting and development, realizing that their minor-league system is their most reliable (and cost-effective) source of talent. Plus, they have a clear philosophy for how they want to develop their players and which players are worth developing in the first place (on-base percentage good).

What kind of grasp does Littlefield have on these notions? It's not yet entirely clear. After taking over for former GM Cam Bonifay, Littlefield shuttled pending free agent Jason Schmidt to the Giants in late July and Todd Ritchie to the White Sox in mid-December for a bundle of young arms. Schmidt and Ritchie are just the kind of middle-of-the-road veterans that Pittsburgh can't afford to be doling out big bucks for. But then Littlefield signed 33-year-old closer Mike Williams, whom he traded to the Astros in July, to a two-year, $7 million deal this offseason. Of what particular use is a closer on a team that won't break .500 the next two seasons? The Pirates lack even a halfway reasonable option at second base, so it's not hard to think of better use for that money.

Of course, all is forgiven if Littlefield can find takers (suckers?) for the Big Three salary albatrosses: first baseman Kevin Young, shortstop Pat Meares and outfielder Derek Bell, all of whom provide the Pirates with severely below-average production for above-average scratch. Find a taker for even one of them, and Littlefield more than earns his take.

But Littlefield's major-league roster is the least of his problems. He inherits a minor-league system in complete disarray. The Pirates, under Bonifay, long favored toolsy type players over guys who can, you know, actually play. As a result, the Pirates probably own the game's worst collection of position prospects (really, it's sad). Littlefield brings some credentials to the table as the former director of player development for the Expos (another tools-obsessed organization) and the Marlins, and has totally revamped his scouting braintrust. Early bad sign: The Pirates' insistence of using phenomenal first-round 2001 draft pick John VanBenschoten as a pitcher, where he'll be subject to the whims of injuries, instead of as a hitter, where he'd be an OPS machine.

Whatever path Littlefield chooses to follow, it's obviously not going to lead to instant gratification (one wonders what kind of pressure he'll be under in two years when the PNC Park honeymoon is over and fans refuse to pay admission to watch the putrid product again. In Detroit, the honeymoon lasted one year). Whatever path it is, though, it's gonna take a little patience.

Check that. A lot of patience. A whole lot.

Scott Burton is a senior reporter for ESPN The Magazine.