Innings  Hits  HR   BB   SO   ERA
Mussina     188     181  18   38  169  3.55
Clemens     182     170  16   56  176  3.56

Clemens has a slight edge in hits allowed, but that's balanced by Mussina's edge in walks. Their strikeout rates are virtually identical, and of course the ERA's could hardly be closer.

Ah, but I've left out their records, haven't I? OK, you can see the W's and the L's ... but you have to look at something else, too.

           W-L    Support
Mussina   13-11     4.3
Clemens   17- 1     7.2

Yes, Clemens has the bizarrely gaudy record, while Mussina is just 13-11; just last week, I heard a broadcaster suggest that Moose has been "a disappointment."

And yes, the Yankees probably figured on getting more than 13 victories out of Mussina by late August. But isn't it possible that the difference in the records compiled by Mussina and Clemens can be explained by the fact that Mussina has received just 4.3 runs of offensive support in his starts, while Clemens has received 7.2 runs of support, highest in the majors?

Mussina has allowed zero or one run in 13 of his 27 starts, which is pretty great; Clemens has allowed zero or one run in seven of his 27 starts.

Mussina has allowed two or three runs in nine starts; Clemens has allowed two or three runs in 11 starts.

Clemens does have one real edge that I could find; he hasn't gotten blown out, not once. While Mussina has four "Disaster Starts" -- coined by Jim Baker to describe a start in which a pitcher finishes with more runs allowed than innings pitched -- it hasn't happened to Clemens once.

On the other hand, Clemens has a bunch of near-disasters.

On April 8, he allowed five runs in six-and-two-thirds ... but his teammates scored 16 and he got the W.

On April 19, he allowed five runs in six innings ... but his teammates scored six, and his bullpen came through with three shutout innings and he avoided the loss.

On May 4, he allowed five runs in five-and-two-thirds innings ... but his teammates scored six, and again the bullpen was perfect as he again escaped with a no-decision.

On May 26, he allowed five runs in seven innings ... but his teammates scored 12 and he got the win.

On July 18, he allowed five runs in five-and-a-third innings ... but his teammates scored eight and he improved to 13-1.

And on August 20, he allowed five runs in six innings ... but his teammates scored nine and he got a no-decision.

Clemens allowed five runs in each of those six games, but he didn't lose any of them: three victories, and three no-decisions in which his teammates bailed him out.

And please, don't give me any of that bunk about some pitchers "knowing how to win." In 1993, Clemens and Mussina both finished the season with 4.46 ERA's. Mussina won 14 games (and lost 6), and Clemens lost 14 games (and won 11).

In the final analysis, Roger Clemens might deserve acclaim as the American League's top pitcher. But he's not there yet, and to suggest otherwise is to ignore the fact that a pitcher's record can be greatly influenced by the support given him by his teammates.

No, the all-time leader is none other than Jamie Quirk, who spent all or part of 18 seasons in the majors, and hit 43 home runs, 30 of those coming in Quirk's three separate stints with the Royals.

Who cares? Well, I do. And so does Mike Mayes, who realized last night that Kansas City's Mark Quinn, who homered last night against the Angels, now has 41 career homers and is poised to move past Quirk into No. 1 on the list. And what of poor Jamie Quirk, about to lose his one real claim to fame? He has probably seen every one of Quinn's home runs, because Quirk is employed as Kansas City's bench coach.

You think Bud Selig will be there when Quinn hits No. 44?

So that leaves the National League, where I see one thing to get truly excited about. At this very moment, the East is all tied up, the Phillies and the Braves co-habitating in the penthouse with 71-60 records. It would be more exciting if one or both teams were better than good, but we take our thrills where we can get them.

In the Central, the Astros are four ahead of the Cubs and six ahead of the Cardinals. In the West, the Diamondbacks lead the Giants by three-and-a-half and the Dodgers by four-and-a-half (Jeff Shaw blew a save last night), and isn't it fairly obvious that Arizona's the class of the group? That doesn't mean they'll win, of course, but can you see any good reason why they wouldn't? I can't.

As for the wild card ... well, it's interesting in its way, but unless you're a fan of one of the teams that's involved, do you really care? We're talking about a battle between a bunch of teams that might, or might not, reach 90 victories. They're all good, but none of them are great. And I still say that Major League Baseball should expand to 32 teams (or contract to 28), go back to eight-team (or seven-team) divisions, and dump the damn wild card. Phooey.

Can the Mariners, who don't have much else to play for, continue their run at the '02 Pirates? Or will those pesky Devil Rays continue their run toward (relative) respectability? Finally, a good excuse for you fans in Tampa and St. Pete to visit the Trop.

TUESDAY, AUGUST 28
Consider these three teams:

        Scored   Allowed   Diff
Team A    649      624      +25
Team B    628      606      +22
Team C    740      728      +12

Now, these teams don't look all that different, at least not in terms of their run differentials, though it's fairly apparent that Team C either plays in a great hitter's park or features great offense and terrible pitching. Team A is the Giants, Team B is the Dodgers, and -- as you probably figured out already -- Team C is the Rockies.

And as you probably know, while the Giants (73-58) and Dodgers (72-59) are both comfortably over .500, the Rockies (56-73) are most decidedly not. And this convergence of events in the NL West standings is, to say the least, somewhat odd. You may be familiar with something called the Pythagorean method; I've written about it many times. Essentially, it takes a team's runs scored and allowed, and converts them to an "expected" record. And for the most part, it works. If we run every team through the method at the end of the season, the great majority will come within three or four games of their actual record, and many will be within one or two.

But while a team with the Rockies' run differential will typically be about 65-64 after 129 games, the Rockies are actually 56-73. That nine-game difference between the projected record and the actual record is huge, and quite likely masks the true quality of the team.

A year ago, the biggest underachievers were the Astros; they finished 72-90 despite scoring (938) nearly as many runs as they allowed (944). They finished nearly nine games off their Pythagorean projection ... or approximately the same number of games that the Rockies are off this year.

Hmmm (I thought) ... maybe there's something about hitter's parks that causes this. After all, Enron Field and Coors Field are certainly the best hitter's parks in the National League. So I checked both Coors Field and Mile High Stadium since the Rockies came into the league. Over their first seven seasons, the Rocks actually won 10 games more than we would have expected, given their runs scored and allowed. But they've given that back the last two years, being minus-9 this season and minus-4 last season. So in the nine seasons of the team's existence, they've won about four games fewer than "expected" ... or about half a game per season, which of course is meaningless.

Oh, and the Astros? This year they're about five games better than their run differential.

That's not much evidence, of course. So I went back and looked for other teams that played in great hitter's parks. Now, one can define "great hitter's parks" however one likes, but I did it the easy way. Using the STATS All-Time Baseball Sourcebook, I simply made a list of all the teams that played a season in which there were at least 30 percent more runs scored -- including the team's runs scored and allowed -- in their home games than in their road games. Make sense?

Anyway, there have been 46 such teams since 1901. Long story short, they have underperformed relative to their run differentials. But not by much. In those 46 seasons, the 46 teams combined to win 40 games fewer than "expected." That's less than one per season, which of course doesn't mean anything at all. What if we split the teams up, though? The Pythagorean method is generally accurate within about 3.5 games. So if a team's actual record came with 3.5 games of its expected record, I considered that a wash. If the team won 3.5 or more games than "expected," that's a plus; if it lost 3.5 or more games than expected, that's a minus.

Plus  Neutral  Minus
  8     24       14

It looks like there might be something here, but of course correlation doesn't show causation. All of which is to say, I don't see any evidence (in this admittedly limited study) to suggest that the Coors Field would result in a poor performance relative to run differential. I suspect that the ballpark hurts the franchise in other ways, but not in this way. Only in the last two seasons have the Rockies really underperformed their run differential.

This is mostly due to bad luck, I believe. Absent a big change before next season, I would expect the Rockies to play at approximately the .500 level next year, solely due to better luck.

However, I have a sneaking suspicion that the Rockies' manager might play a part in the team's poor performance. Here's Buddy Bell's career to this point:

          ExpWins  ActualWins   Diff
1996 Det     56       53         - 3
1997 Det     80       79         - 1
1998 Det     55       52         - 3
2000 Col     87       82         - 5
2001 Col     65       56         - 9
Totals      343      322         -21

I've rounded the numbers here; without rounding, the difference between expected wins and the actual wins for Bell's teams is 21.8. But -21 is close enough, and what's striking is that in five seasons, not one of Bell's teams has exceeded expectations.

What does it mean? It probably doesn't mean anything. I've spent years arguing that such differences are largely attributable to luck, and I'm not changing my story now. That said, if I were running the Rockies I would take a very close look at Buddy Bell, and try to figure out if he's part of the solution, or part of the problem.

MONDAY, AUGUST 27
I do a fair amount of radio, and for the last month or so, a common question has been, "How many games will the Mariners end up winning?"

My answer has generally been something like, "I'm convinced that the M's are a legitimately great team, but I also think that they've got such a big lead that they'll probably coast some down the stretch, and finish with 'only' 110 wins or so."

I'm not so sure about that any more. For one thing, a lot of great teams have enjoyed huge leads in September and did not slack off.

The 1998 Yankees, for example, enjoyed an 18-and-half-game lead on the morning of September 1. They went 16-11 the rest of the way.

The 1986 Mets enjoyed a 22-game lead on the morning of September 11. They went 16-8 the rest of the way.

The 1970 Orioles had a big lead in mid-September. And then they finished the season with an 11-game winning streak.

That's anecdotal evidence, of course. And here's some more ... I was at Safeco Field this past Thursday and Saturday, and in both games saw indications that this team won't be doing a lot of coasting, not if the manager has anything to say about it.

Thursday night, the Mariners owned a 2-1 lead over the Tigers after five innings, at which point Seattle starter Joel Pineiro -- who had allowed just three hits and one run, but also issued four walks -- was lifted in favor of John Halama. Tony Clark greeted Halama with a fly ball to deepest center field, but Mike Cameron made a leaping catch that might have saved a home run. Then Halama walked Rob Fick and Randall Simon, before retiring Jose Macias on a foul pop to the catcher.

Two outs, and Halama was close to escaping. And most managers, I think, would have let Halama try. After all, this game really didn't mean anything, plus ex-starter Halama is as durable as any reliever in the league. So why get into the quality relievers in the sixth inning of a meaningless game?

It apparently wasn't meaningless to Uncle Lou, though; he strolled to the mound, and summoned Jeff Nelson to face Shane Halter. Nelson actually walked Halter, but got Deivi Cruz on a foul pop to end the inning. And with the help of Arthur Rhodes and Kazuhiro Sasaki, the M's wound up winning the game, 5-1.

Saturday afternoon, the Mariners and the Indians were tied at two runs apiece in the top of the ninth. Rhodes was called upon to protect the tie with two outs, a Tribesman on first base, and Omar Vizquel due up. But Rhodes never threw a pitch to Vizquel, who precipitated an argument by demanding that Rhodes remove his diamond earrings. According to Vizquel, the sun was glinting off the stones and distracting him.

Rhodes wound up getting ejected and Halama came in to pitch. And before Lou Piniella headed back to the dugout, he turned and issued orders to Halama. Now, I suspect that the old Uncle Lou would have said to Halama something like, "You know what to do." And in the stands, many of us assumed Halama's first pitch would be high-and-tight, or low-and-tight ... somewhere and tight, because that's the way Piniella's always played it.

But if Halama had thrown anywhere near Vizquel, he would have been ejected, too. And the Mariners' chance of winning would have been lowered by some unknown quantity. And so Halama's first pitch was a strike, right down the middle. And his second pitch was a strike, too. Vizquel popped to first base, and the Indians were done. The Mariners finally won in the bottom of the 11th when John "Mr. Stable" Rocker threw a baseball down the right-field line on a bunt.

So no, I don't think the Mariners are going to coast down the stretch. I don't think they even remember how to coast. That, or Piniella just won't let them. Even after losing Sunday, the M's are on pace for 116 wins, and I'll be mildly surprised if they don't stick fairly close to that pace, all the way to the wire.

As good as the Mariners are, though, I do believe they've got a couple of questions to answer between now and October 1.

First, who's going to play left field when Andy Pettitte or Mark Mulder or Barry Zito or Chuck Finley starts? Right now it's Stan Javier, but the Mariners would love to have Jay Buhner available for that job. Buhner is currently rehabbing in Triple-A and the reports on him are fairly good, but the club won't know anything for sure until he's facing major-league pitchers and playing left field regularly.

And second, who's their fourth starter in October? Freddy Garcia (14-5, 3.29), Aaron Sele (13-4, 3.51) and Jamie Moyer (15-5, 3.67) are all locks to make the postseason rotation. That leaves Paul Abbott (13-3, 4.20) or Pineiro (3-0, 1.86) for the other postseason starts. Does it matter? You bet. While no No. 5 starter started a postseason game last year, both pennant winners employed their No. 4 starters three times in the postseason (Denny Neagle went 0-2 in three starts for the Yanks, Bobby Jones went 1-1 in three starts for the Mets).

Yeah, it matters. This ain't the old days, and the No. 4 starters will play a big role for any club that gets past the first round. So let's look a bit more closely at Abbott and Pineiro (both of them right-handed, by the way):

          Innings  Hits   BB   SO  
Abbott      133     119   64   96
Pineiro      48      26   17   37

By any objective measure, the rookie has out-pitched the veteran in a big way. But there are, of course, some other considerations here. First, there's the huge difference in experience between Abbott and Pineiro. Abbott turns 34 in a few weeks, and started his first major-league game when President Bush was an old guy who once flew airplanes in World War II. Pineiro turns 23 in a few weeks, and was still a rookie when President Bush was a (relatively) young guy who once flew airplanes in the National Guard.

Frankly, I don't think that experience makes a whole lot of difference in October; a few years ago, I found that rookie pitchers had acquitted themselves quite well in postseason play. But a lot of baseball men do think that experience matters, and for that reason I suspect that Pat Gillick and Lou Piniella won't be excited at the idea of starting Pineiro in the Division Series, or thereafter.

And there's a more practical reason, too. Thanks in part to pitching coach Bryan Price, the Mariners are pretty darn careful with their young pitchers, and they've kept Pineiro on a pretty short leash. In seven starts (six of them effective), Pineiro has topped 100 pitches only twice, with a high of 112. But in the postseason, facing good lineups under a great amount of stress, pitchers tend to throw more pitches than usual.

Actually, that last sentence is nothing more than an educated guess, since I didn't actually take the time to study postseason pitch counts. Still, it seems like a moderately safe assumption. And if you've got a pitcher who quite likely won't be able, or allowed, to consistently pitch at least six innings, then you don't want him in your postseason rotation. Why? Because you can't afford to regularly run through your bullpen in October, when so many games are close.

All of which is to say, despite how well Pineiro has pitched, he's probably not going to make the Mariners' postseason rotation. And if Pineiro's not in the October rotation -- yes, I'm getting to the point now -- he shouldn't be in the September rotation, either. Why? Because if he's going to be a reliever in October, he might as well start training for that job right now.

So here's my advice for Gillick and Piniella (not that they need it, or asked for it) ... If you don't trade Brett Tomko for a right-handed bat before September 1, then bring him up when the rosters expand that day, and hand him Pineiro's rotation slot with a nice bow around it (and if you do trade Tomko, then put John Halama back in the rotation). Move Joel (by the way, it's pronounced jo-EL, like somebody from the planet Krypton) to the bullpen, and get him some work in at least a few close games down the stretch.

And then go out and win the World Series, you crazy kids.

THURSDAY, AUGUST 23
A quick tour through my e-mail of the last few days ...

Rob, In your column yesterday, you didn't even mention who Sosa's hitting coach was back when he was just a hacker, before Jeff Pentland. Wasn't it Tony Muser? Hmmm ... Dale Smith

Amazing what the mind can forget, Dale. I, the titular head of the Tony Muser Fan Club, somehow failed to make the connection between Tony Muser and Jeff Pentland. One might, in fact, argue that Tony Muser leaving Chicago was one of the best things that ever happened to the Cubs and one of the worst things that ever happened to the Royals. Because one can reasonably argue that if Muser had remained in Chicago, Sammy Sosa would never have hit 66 home runs in one season, and further that the Cubs would not have reached the postseason in 1998, nor would they be contending for a postseason spot this season.

It's funny, though, in his book Sosa "wrote" of the 1997 season, "Amid all of this, the Cubs tried to find any answers they could. One was to hire a new batting coach and take the unusual step of bringing him on during the middle of the season. His name was Jeff Pentland ..." Well, it wasn't an unusual step at all, because the incumbent batting coach, Muser, quit at the All-Star break to take over as manager of the Royals. So it would have been "unusual" if the Cubs had not brought in a new batting coach during the middle of the season.

Rob,

I read your column regularly and enjoy it very much. As a Yankees fan, I was very interested in what you had to say about the Chuck Knoblauch/Alfonso Soriano situation during spring training. Knoblauch in left obviously has not worked as well as planned, but I was wondering what your thoughts were on Soriano.

You did not seem to think too highly of him at the beginning of the season, but he now looks to me like one of the best-hitting second basemen in the AL. He's third in the league with a .758 OPS after spending the first month with an OBP lower than his batting average. Anyway, I'd be interested in your thoughts.

Keep up the good work.

Jim Beha
NY, NY

I've been getting a lot of messages about Alfonso Soriano lately, but this is one of the first in which the writer was at least halfway civil.

Soriano has, indeed, developed into a solid player, a better player than I thought he would be at this point. While I always expected him to become a decent or better major leaguer, his minor-league stats just didn't suggest that it would happen this soon. And of course, it's only one season; a year ago, a young middle infielder named Rafael Furcal looked like a good bet for future stardom.

I do need to correct you, though, Jim. Soriano currently ranks not third, but sixth among the nine regular American League second basemen, with a 754 OPS through Tuesday's games. On the other hand, thanks to his speed Soriano ranks fifth in offensive winning percentage (ahead of Ray Durham).

On the other hand, my main point at the time -- or at least, I hope it was -- was that giving everyday jobs to both Soriano and Knoblauch was stupid, because you can't have a lineup with two second basemen. Well, I was right about Knoblauch, but on the other hand the Yankees are comfortably in first place. So yes, I'm happy to eat yet another piece of humble pie. The Yankees have thrived this season despite their inability to "fix" the left-field problem, and of course no team has a star at every position.

Now that Pedro Martinez has gotten pretty good at not staying healthy for a whole season, do you think the Red Sox should see if he can stay healthy as a relief pitcher? If he could pitch 2 or 3 innings a shot at fairly frequent intervals and stay healthy it might be worth it. I always was impressed with the year Bill Campbell had in 1976 (I think it was 17 wins, 5 losses and 20 saves in 168 innings) and with the year that Mike Marshall pitched 208 innings, all in relief (1974?).

I could write an entire column on this subject, but let me just throw out a few considerations.

Campbell and Marshall did indeed thrive with gigantic workloads in relief ... but it might be argued that both eventually suffered from those workloads.

Campbell threw 168 innings in 1976 and then 140 in 1977 ... but managed only 51 innings in 1978, 55 innings in 1979, and 41 innings in 1980.

Marshall threw 208 innings in 1974 (after throwing 179 in 1973) ... but dropped to 109 innings in 1975, 99 in 1976, and then 42 in 1977.

There simply isn't much evidence that pitchers can handle high relief workloads, season after season after season.

Now, would Pedro be as valuable in relief as he is in the rotation? Theoretically, it's possible, because if you only used him in close games, a higher percentage of his innings would be important innings. That said, if you used him only in close games, you'd have a very tough time regulating his workload, because sometimes you'd want to use him three or four days in a row, and sometimes you wouldn't use him for a week.

So while using Pedro as a reliever might work brilliantly in a computer game, I suspect that's it's highly impractical in the real world. He shouldn't be in the bullpen until the day comes when he can't make 20 starts per season.

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 22
I believe that I've eaten crow, or humble pie, or whatever you're supposed to eat when you're admitting that you were wrong, at least once in regard to Sammy Sosa, but I suppose that I have yet another meal or two coming.

You see, after the 1997 season, I wrote a column in which I argued that Sosa was greatly overrated. I even made up a new nickname for him: "Sammy So-so." Of course, all Sosa did in 1998 was hit 66 home runs and win the MVP Award in something of a landslide. Sammy So-so, indeed.

What could cause such a gross error on my part? A couple of things; one of them excusable, one of them not so excusable.

First, the not so excusable ... I made a classic error in my evaluation when I placed a greater weight on the just-ended season than on Sosa's recent career.

      Age    OBP  Slug
1994   25   .339  .545 
1995   26   .340  .500
1996   27   .323  .564
1997   28   .300  .480

After that last season I happily exclaimed, "A-ha! See, I told you that Sammy's inability to control the strike zone would get him in trouble." I saw what I wanted to see, while ignoring the three previous good -- not great, but very good -- seasons. Sosa wasn't the great player that everyone told me he was, and so I didn't give him credit for being the good player that he actually was.

All that said, there simply wasn't any good reason to think that Sammy Sosa would, at the relatively advanced age of 29, become one of baseball's biggest stars. Haven't you wondered how that happened? As it happened, a couple of weeks ago I was poking around in a bookstore and ran across a copy of "Sosa: An Autobiography," ghostwritten by Marcos Breton and published last year. Most books like this aren't what you'd call scintillating reads, and this one was no exception. Still, for the low, low, LOW price of six dollars, I thought I might find an answer to that question. How did Sosa jump from 36 home runs and 36 unintentional walks one season, to 66 and 59 the next?

Well, in midseason 1997 Jeff Pentland joined the Cubs as hitting coach. As Pentland says in Sosa's book,

The two things that really stood out were [Sosa's] attitude and his aggressiveness. He is about as aggressive a person as I've ever been around. I've always felt as a coach that the more more aggressive the player is, the better, because it's your job as a teacher to harness that aggression to where it's productive. At that point Sammy was aggressive, but he was wildly aggressive.

And there was no direction or control of that aggression. His holes in his swing were off the plate -- you could get him to chase balls. In other words, he was lacking in his ability to read pitches, which I think is critical. Obviously, the guys who do it best are the best hitters in the game: Barry Bonds, Gary Sheffield, and Jeff Bagwell. Those guys have tremendous ability to identify pitches when they are batting.

My memory of Sammy Sosa from all those pre-1998 seasons boils down to one thing: Sosa striking out upon taking a mighty cut at a slider a foot outside and bouncing in the dirt. Now, it's one thing for a hitting coach to recognize a hitter's deficiencies; it's a far rarer thing for a hitter himself to recognize his deficiencies, and possess both the desire and ability to significantly improve.

But at the close of the 1997 season, Sosa had just signed a fat new contract and he had suffered through a sub-par (for him) season, and the combination just might have been exactly what he needed. Well, that and Jeff Pentland, who says, "The important thing about hitting is that it's like opening up a flower. When it's there and the petals are all folded in, you don't know how beautiful it might be. What I made Sammy aware of was that there was a lot of finesse and softness in hitting."

But again, Sosa himself had to want to change, and by all accounts he did. "In spring training of that year," Sosa remembered, "when Jeff Pentland and I would meet daily to discuss hitting, we set out many goals because we thought it could be a special season. So we talked a lot about me taking more walks. We talked about me hitting the ball to the opposite field. ... We talked technique. We talked game strategies and identifying the pitches. We talked about my footwork, where I held the bat, how I held the bat, how I swung the bat. ... But going into that season, Jeff and I never -- ever -- talked about home runs. ... Home runs were the furthest thing from my mind."

Specifically, Pentland reconstructed Sosa's swing. Sosa dropped his arms, and changed his footwork to include a revised "tap step," and the result was, as Pentland says, "that Sammy would begin to use his legs better than anybody in the big leagues. ... Sammy was learning that power was actually more coordination and timing than brute strength."

And of course, Sammy Sosa went out and hit 66 home runs. He's been just about as good every season since, and is quite likely on his way to the Hall of Fame.

Not everybody can do what Sosa has done, though. Remember Raul Mondesi? In April and May, just having turned 30, Mondesi put on a real show; in 53 games, he scored 40 runs, drove in 33, and drew 42 walks. The Blue Jays were playing well, and Mondesi -- "the Buffalo" -- earned himself a feature in Sports Illustrated.

And since then? In 67 games, Mondesi's scored 36 runs, driven in 35 ... and drawn 25 walks. He's still on pace for a solid season, but it's a Raul Mondesi season rather than a superstar season.

TUESDAY, AUGUST 21
A friend writes,

Hudson and Mulder are 1-2 in innings pitched. Do you think Howe is pulling a Billy Martin and blowing out a good, young staff?

Thanks, Rob.

David

I don't consider myself an expert on this subject, but a few words in support of Art Howe ...

Tim Hudson and Mark Mulder have pitched so many innings because they've been so healthy and so good. No missed starts for niggling injuries, and of course they've both pitched extremely well this season. In fact, they're not only 1-2 in innings pitched, but also 2-4 in ERA in the American League. (By the way, how many people know that White Sox near-rookie Mark Buehrle is No. 1?)

Hudson has topped 120 pitches twice, and then just barely (123 and 122 in consecutive starts). Hudson has thrown eight or more innings in nine starts. His pitch counts in those nine games: 103, 107, 104, 104, 102, 119, 102, 105, 113. So it's not like Howe "made" Hudson throw extra pitches with the ridiculous goal of getting him a complete game or a shutout or whatever.

Mulder has thrown more than 110 pitches only twice, but one of those outings is, shall we say, a bit questionable; on May 2, he threw 132 pitches. That was a 6-0 game, and there was absolutely no reason for that last inning. The previous day, the A's had used only two relievers, and the day before that they hadn't used any relievers at all (because they didn't play). But since May 2, Mulder hasn't thrown more than 112 pitches in a game. And while I will admit that this is very close to pure speculation, I am guessing that Billy Beane instructed Art Howe to make sure that Mulder didn't top 130, or perhaps even 120, again.

All of which is to say, the A's have been about as restrained -- that single 132-pitch outing aside -- as any team in history has been with two young starters as good as Mulder and Hudson. The Athletics seem to have a plan for most things they do, if not all of them, and their handling of Tim Hudson and Mark Mulder seems to conform to some sort of plan. And to paraphrase George Patton, some sort of plan is better than no plan at all.

Billy Martin had a plan, 20 years ago, and for awhile it worked out quite nicely. Martin's plan was to work his starters as if it were still 1920 rather than 1980, and the Oakland A's improved from 54-108 to 83-79, continuing Martin's amazing success with previously-woeful clubs. Here's how the A's compared to the No. 2 team in the American League in complete games, in 1980 and '81:

                 CG  CG%
1980  Oakland    94  58.0
      Milwaukee  48  29.6


1981  Oakland    60  55.0
      Cleveland  33  32.0    

The A's won the first half of the abominable split-season in 1981, then swept the Royals in the first round of the playoffs before getting swept by the Yankees in the ALCS. And then in 1982 the A's crashed to a 68-94 record, thanks in part to a pitching staff that was racked by injuries, and Martin got fired.

I'm not saying that Martin destroyed Oakland's pitchers -- they all deny it -- but what I am saying is that leading the American League with 237 innings, as Hudson may do this year, isn't exactly the same as leading the American League with 290 innings, as Rick Langford did in 1980. Billy Martin believed in complete games for their own sake, and for two years it worked so I'm not going to criticize him for it; in fact, I think that one can construct a reasonable case for Billy Martin as a Hall of Famer.

But Martin pushed his pitchers past the norms of his time, at least in terms of innings pitched (it would be interesting to look at pitch counts; Martin's pitchers did throw a lot of strikes), while Art Howe has not pushed his pitchers past the norms of our time, with the lone exception of Mulder's May 2 start.

MONDAY, AUGUST 20
Catching up on some things that happened last week ...

That's old news, of course, so the question today is, are the Red Sox better off now than they were last week? I think this actually boils down to two other questions.

One, is Joe Kerrigan going to be as good a manager as Jimy Williams was? No, it's not likely. Historically, not many men have lasted nearly nine years as major-league managers and posted a winning record. It's simply unlikely that Kerrigan will match Williams' success, though of course one might reasonably argue that Dan Duquette knows more about baseball managers than Rob Neyer does.

And two, is Joe Kerrigan's replacement going to be as good a pitching coach as Joe Kerrigan was? Again, it's not likely. Kerrigan's not perfect -- his lack of success with young pitchers, most notable -- but nobody's better with veterans, and since Duquette likes to trade young pitchers for old pitchers, Kerrigan's the best guy for the job.

So it seems to me that when you replace Williams with Kerrigan, you're hurting yourself in not one, but two important spots.

A few years ago, I wrote essentially the same thing when the Orioles fired their great manager, Davey Johnson, and replaced him with their great pitching coach, Ray Miller. Now, I'm certainly not going to argue that the Orioles collapsed solely due to Miller's promotion, but the facts remain that the Orioles dropped from second in the American League in ERA to seventh, and from a 98-64 record to a 79-83 mark. It certainly wasn't the worst immediate decline for a pennant winner that you'll ever see, but you won't see many worse, either.

Will the Red Sox suffer a similar fall? I sincerely doubt it. A $110 million payroll will mask many sins, especially when a hefty chunk of that payroll is actually going to guys who can still play, which wasn't always the case in Baltimore. Bud Selig could probably manage a team that includes Pedro Martinez, Manny Ramirez and Nomar Garciaparra to 80-85 wins. And if Joe Kerrigan has all three of those fellows healthy next season, it wouldn't be a shock to see the Sox win 90 games.

There is at least one positive result here; the dismissal of Williams means the Red Sox will no longer have the two most important non-players in the organization at odds with each other, which really did hurt them last year. It didn't keep them from winning the wild card or anything, but I do suspect the Williams-Duquette feud cost the Bostons at least two or three games ... and of course, sometimes two or three games can make all the difference in the world.

Look, there's no question that Gooden and Darling and Fernandez were all fine pitchers in their time. But those three were together during two postseasons: 1986 and 1988. Those two Octobers, the above trio combined to start 14 postseason games. You like to guess how many of those 14 starts they won?

One.

Ron Darling won Game 4 of the 1986 World Series. Now, these guys didn't pitch poorly; they posted a 3.87 ERA in those two Octobers, which is a good figure if not as good as their regular-season marks. But they went just 1-7, because (1) they didn't have much luck, (2) they were facing better hitters than usual, and (3) the other teams had some pretty good pitchers, too.

Yes, Hudson-Mulder-Zito (and let's not forget Cory Lidle) have pitched very well this year, and quite possibly rank as the best rotation in the American League, maybe even better than New York's or Seattle's. But who had the National League's best rotation virtually every year in the 1990s? The Atlanta Braves. And how many World Series did they win?

FRIDAY, AUGUST 10
As promised, here's an "extra" column. Next week I'll be on vacation, but this space will be ably filled by five guest columnists -- actually, four columnists and two co-columnists -- beginning with Bill James on Monday.

Rob,

Hi. I enjoy your column. In today's Philadelphia Daily News, Larry Bowa, discussing Scott Rolen, is quoted as saying: "He's the best third baseman (defensively) in the league, by far. He saves 75 to 100 runs per year."

I've been reading your column long enough to know that that is a ridiculous assumption. I was wondering what your opinion of Rolen as a player is? As of right now, it doesn't look like the Phillies will make a great effort to sign him to a mega-deal. This is a player who was once thought of as the "next Mike Schmidt" and "the franchise." Now it looks like he won't even be around for the opening of the new ballpark in 2004.

Thanks.
Mike Lewis
Staff writer, Delaware State News/Milford Chronicle

Of course it's a ridiculous assumption, Mike. But before we hold Larry Bowa's feet to the sabermetric fire, we should note that his affliction is a common one among baseball managers. Just this season, Tony Muser claimed that shortstop Rey Sanchez saves three runs per game, which of course would make Sanchez the most valuable player in the game today, if not the most valuable athlete in the history of professional sports. Yes, you have to consider the source. But Whitey Herzog was a damn good manager, and Herzog once claimed that second baseman Frank White saved the Royals two or three runs per game with his defense.

Granted, we don't know exactly what managers mean when they say these things. I can think of three possibilities:

1. Bowa means that Rolen saves the Phillies 75 to 100 runs per year, relative to an average defensive third baseman.

2. Bowa means that Rolen saves the Phillies 75 to 100 runs per year, relative to a poor defensive third baseman.

3. Bowa means that Rolen saves the Phillies 75 to 100 runs per year, relative to not having a third baseman at all.

The problem of course, is that 75 to 100 is too high for Nos. 1 and 2, and too low for No. 3.

If Rolen were saving the Phillies 75 runs per year -- always better to be conservative -- then how good would he be? He'd be the best player in the game, worth an "extra" seven or eight victories per season, which would push him past Barry Bonds and Alex Rodriguez and anybody else you might think deserves that title.

Rolen is, of course, a fine defensive third baseman, a Gold Glover who probably saves something on the order of a dozen runs per season, relative to an average defensive third baseman. As for Rolen's future, if I were the Phillies I'd try to get him signed to a long-term deal, at least based on the information I've got at hand.

Due to his back ailment, Rolen played only 112 games in 1999, then 128 last season. But this year he's played virtually every day, and is on pace to play 158 games. Strangely enough, though, while Rolen is apparently healthier than he's been in some time, his numbers this year are the worst he's posted since 1996, when he was 21 years old.

       Games  OBP  Slug
1996     37  .322  .400
1997    156  .377  .469
1998    160  .391  .532
1999    112  .368  .525
2000    128  .370  .551
2001    111  .369  .441

Rolen's OBP this season falls right in line; that .369 is just five points lower than his .374 career mark, which of course is an irrelevant difference. But Rolen's .441 slugging percentage this season has to be a cause for at least moderate concern. He slugged .551 last season -- his third straight season at better than .500 -- but this year he's down to .441, with only a dozen homers in 111 games.

Now, there was a time when a .441 slugging percentage and an 810 OPS were fine figures for a third baseman ... but that time has passed. Even if we count Albert Pujols as a left fielder rather than a third baseman, Rolen currently ranks sixth in the National League among non-Colorado third basemen in the OPS list. And while a middle-of-the pack hitter with Gold Glove defense is certainly a valuable player, he's probably not worth a "mega-deal."

The question, then, is one that I'm not really equipped to answer ... Will Scott Rolen get his power back? Upon such questions, the future of franchises are made. Scott Rolen is still only 26, and so we might expect him to regain his power, and retake his place among the game's top third basemen. And if he's not in a Phillies uniform when he does that, the franchise will look mighty silly for letting him go.

THURSDAY, AUGUST 9
Let's take a look at the last 10 major leaguers elected to the Hall of Fame by the Veterans Committee, along with my best guess as to whether or not they would have been elected under the new rules (which I'm assuming you've already read about):

Phil Rizzuto     No
Richie Ashburn   No
Vic Willis       No
Jim Bunning      Maybe
Nellie Fox       No
George Davis     No
Larry Doby       Maybe
Orlando Cepeda   Maybe
Bid McPhee       No
Bill Mazeroski   No

No slam-dunk choices among the 10, but of course that's the nature of the Veterans Committee choices; if a player is obviously a Hall of Famer, then the BBWAA would already have put the guy in. But there are three 19th-century players on that list, and there's no way in hell that the new Veterans Committee is going to put any more of them in. Phil Rizzuto and Richie Ashburn and Nellie Fox? Not enough of their contemporaries are members of the new Veterans Committee. Mazeroski? I doubt it, not with his hitting stats. You had to actually see him turn the double play to appreciate him. Well, that or believe in fielding stats, which ex-players don't do (with the possible exception of fielding percentage, which of course happens to be the least relevant fielding stat).

So that leaves Bunning, Doby and Cepeda. Bunning played in the 1960s, and he spent significant time in both leagues. Doby has the "pioneer factor" working for him. And Cepeda has the great name, along with a certain aura that causes people to remember him as better than he actually was.

Mind you, I'm not saying that any of these guys would have been elected if the new rules had been in place when they actually were elected; I'm just saying that they would have drawn significant support.

But why, exactly? Well, I guess I've started this thing backwards. Before I guess which current Hall of Famers would or wouldn't have been elected, I should answer this question: "What kind of player might we expect to get significant support from this new Veterans Committee?"

First of all, I don't think numbers have much to do with it. I mean, the numbers will play a part, but nearly anyone with obvious "Hall of Fame numbers" is already in (or still being considered by the BBWAA) with perhaps two or three exceptions. No, the history of the Veterans Committee suggests that the players will vote for their old pals. I don't mean that as negatively as it sounds, but most of us are adults so let's face facts. Players entrusted with a Hall of Fame ballot tend to vote for their peers, and especially their teammates. If you want to write a history of the Veterans Committee, that's your starting point and your ending point. And I certainly don't see any reason to think that will change now. When Joe Morgan talks about non-Hall of Famers who should be Hall of Famers, who does he talk about? Dave Concepcion (a teammate, of course), Steve Garvey, Curt Flood, Maury Wills ... all of them National Leaguers.

Nothing against Joe Morgan, he just happens to be human like the rest of us. But we can probably assume that the more Hall of Famers you played with or against, the better your chances of drawing support from this new Veterans Committee. Can we somehow quantify this?

I started by entering the names of the Veterans Committee's 59 ex-players into a spreadsheet. I added Ozzie Smith because he'll certainly join the list next year. Actually, two spreadsheets, one for the National League and one for the American League. My column headings began with 1928 (Al Lopez's first season in the majors) and ended with 1996 (Ozzie Smith's last). Next, for every player I simply entered a "1" in each box that corresponded with one of his "league-seasons." For example, on the American League page Rollie Fingers gets a "1" in his boxes for 1969 through 1976 (Oakland) and 1981 through 1985 (Milwaukee), and on the National League page he gets a "1" in his boxes for 1977 through 1980 (San Diego). (For anyone trying to duplicate my "research," I did not count a rookie season if it only consisted of a few games, but I did count seasons in which a player was in the military.)

I suppose this all sounds needlessly complicated to some of you, but the goal is to be able to look at, say, the National League in 1971, and find out how many current members of the Veterans Committee were playing in that league-season.

Well, the answer is 22, which is tied with the National League in 1970 for the highest score. We could also look at groups of seasons, centered around a particular season. For example, the "five-year cluster score" for the National League in 1971 is 101. Here, I'll show you what I mean:

       Score
1969     21
1970     22
1971     22
1972     19
1973     17
5-Yr    101

Below are the three league-seasons that have the highest five-year cluster scores, where none of these individual years fall in the others' groups.

N.L. 1969   106
N.L. 1966   100
N.L. 1972    94

This shouldn't be particularly startling to anyone. The National League dominated the All-Star Game in the 1960s and '70s, in part because the National League had a significant percentage of the best players. The five-year National League cluster with 1969 at its center contains 106 seasons of players on the new Veterans Committee. The best five-year American League cluster? It's 1974, with only 76 seasons for players on the new Veterans Committee.

If you sum up all of the player seasons -- no more of those bothersome clusters ("What in the hell is Neyer talking about?") -- the National League has the edge, 591 seasons to 525.

What does all this mean? Well, to me it means that if you weren't a National Leaguer in the late 1960s or early 1970s, you're going to have a very tough time getting elected to the Hall of Fame by the new Veterans Committee.

Who does this "hurt"? Well, Luis Tiant becomes eligible for consideration by the Veterans Committee in 2005, and though he's never drawn much support from the BBWAA, Tiant does have a decent argument. However, I don't see him getting elected by the Veterans Committee, because he spent his entire career in the American League (save nine starts for the Pirates near the end). Pitching in the World Series will help him some, I suppose, but Tiant simply didn't pitch against enough of the players who will be doing the voting.

Others who probably won't fare well, because of the time and/or the league in which they played, include Roger Maris, Minnie Minoso, Tony Oliva ... and anybody who played before 1950. As Joe Morgan said not long ago, "It's difficult for me ... to critique Dom [DiMaggio] because I never saw him play." DiMaggio and Mel Harder, both championed by Ted Williams and (not coincidentally) both still living, can pretty much forget about the Hall of Fame.

The winners? I suspect that they'll be the National Leaguers of the late '60s ... and if a guy played in the American League, too? Well, all the better. I suspect that Ron Santo will lead the voting in 2003, perhaps followed by Dick Allen. Santo fared pretty well in the BBWAA voting in 1998, his last year of eligibility, and of course he spent the 1960s in the National League. He spent a season in the American League, but played terribly so that's not likely to help him much. He's also spent the last 12 years as a radio broadcaster for the Cubs, and that should help him.

Gil Hodges was a big RBI man in the National League in the 1950s, but perhaps just as important, he managed in both the American League and the National in the 1960s, so a great many of the current Veterans Committee saw him up close and personal. And of course, Hodges was highly respected around the game.

Dick Allen had some problems staying in the lineup, and was regarded by many as something of a problem child. But when he did play, he absolutely murdered the ol' horsehide. We might, if only halfway accurately, describe Allen as an early version of Gary Sheffield. Allen spent most of the 1960s in the National League, and he also played four seasons in the American League (and won the MVP in one of them). And while it's true that a lot of people didn't like Allen -- which certainly won't help him with the broadcasters and the writers -- it's also true that a lot of Allen's teammates did like him.

I don't think that Dick Allen will make it, but he'll do better than most on the ballot ... and you see, that's the rub. Yesterday I asked six learned baseball fans who would be elected by the Veterans Committee in 2003.

Two of them said, "Ron Santo."

Four of them said, "Nobody."

And I think that's about right. I think that Santo has something like a 1-in-3 chance of finally making it ... and I think there's something like a 2-in-3 chance that nobody makes it. Because that 75 percent standard is going to be very, very tough for anyone to meet. With the old Veterans Committee, 13 or 14 old men would go into a big room and get to horse-trading. You vote for my guy this year, and I'll vote for your guy next year. Everybody's happy because everybody gets to eventually get their buddies into the Hall of Fame.

Well, no longer. While politicking won't be impossible -- Joe Morgan politicks on national TV all the time for Dave Concepcion and others, because that's part of his job -- it won't be like it was. There won't be any vote-trading, and there will be relatively few personal appeals on the behalf of old friends.

Is the new system perfect? Of course not. Bad Bill Dahlen's out of the running now, and so is Parisian Bob Caruthers and Carl Mays and Pebbly Jack Glasscock and just about anyone else that didn't play in a league with Joe Morgan or Harmon Killebrew. And yes, it would be nice if Bob Costas were a part of the process. Or Bill James. Or Whitey Herzog. Or John Thorn. Or Jon Miller. Or, God forbid, Rob Neyer.

That said, a system that might (or might not) give us Ron Santo and Dick Allen is immensely preferable to a system that did give us Vic Willis and Phil Rizzuto and Hack Wilson.

I fear that it won't last, though. What happens if the Veterans Committee doesn't elect anyone in 2003, and then again in 2005? The Hall will lower the percentage from 75 to a number that will likely result in at least one player being elected every two (or perhaps four) years. Quite simply, the Hall of Fame isn't interested in conducting elections without winners. It's just bad business.

But it's probably OK if the number drops to 70 or 65 percent. There are a few players ignored by the BBWAA who shouldn't be. Always have been, always will be. Pee Wee Reese was a great player, and he had to wait for the Veterans Committee to elect him. Arky Vaughan had to wait, and so did Home Run Baker. And yes, Ron Santo should probably be in the Hall of Fame, even if his career was a little short. Maybe Dick Allen should be in there, too. And as the years pass, other candidates overlooked by the BBWAA will come before the Veterans Committee, and a few will get their pass.

But just a few. And of course, that's the way it should be.

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 8
Yes, I will weigh in on the Hall of Fame's new Veterans Committee. But not until tomorrow, because (1) the research took longer than I figured, and (2) I didn't get out of Safeco Field last night until nearly midnight. And that game, all 14 innings of it, contained enough twists and turns for the makings of a column. So I'll write about the Veterans Committee tomorrow (which gives you another day to send me your "thoughts" on the subject).

Last night's game in Seattle went according to plan -- rookie Joel Pineiro pitches brilliantly, Mariners take 3-1 lead into the late innings -- until the eighth. Pineiro went seven innings and allowed only three hits and two walks, while striking out 11 Blue Jays. But he also threw 111 pitches in those seven innings, and the New Lou doesn't let his young starters run up high pitch counts.

So Piniella played it like he always does. With Homer Bush (right), Jose Cruz (switch), and Alex Gonzalez (right) due up in top of the eighth, Jeff Nelson trotted in from the bullpen. The same Jeff Nelson who had limited right-handed hitters to a .111 batting average this season.

Bush led off and worked the count full, but lifted an easy fly to Ichiro in right field. Cruz -- who would finish the night zero for seven -- popped to shortstop. So far, so good. But somehow Gonzalez -- then hitting .234 against righties (and why is he batting No. 2, anyway?) -- ripped a double off Nelson. And then another right-handed hitter (Shannon Stewart) doubled, though it really wasn't a double. Stewart blooped the ball into short center fielder, and dashed to second after noticing that neither of the middle infielders happened to be covering the keystone. Believe it or not, the Mariners didn't execute! (Yes, kids, it even happens to them.)

Still 3-2, Mariners ... but Carlos Delgado up next, and so Piniella played it like he always does, summoning Arthur "Death to Lefties" Rhodes from the pen. Rhodes had held left-handed hitters to a .191 batting average, including one home run in 89 at-bats. Of course, Carlos Delgado isn't just any old left-handed hitter, and so he crushed one of Rhodes' fastballs nearly into the upper deck, 448 feet away from the plate. And just that fast, the vaunted Seattle bullpen had converted a 3-1 lead into a 3-4 deficit.

But thanks to a passed ball (Darrin Fletcher) and a wild pitch (Billy Koch), the Mariners scored a run in their half of the ninth, and so went to the 10th ... and the 11th, and the 12th, and the 13th, and the 14th. The M's finally won in the bottom of the 14th, when yet again -- I just saw this in Portland a few nights ago -- the visiting team intentionally walked the bases loaded, and then the pitcher couldn't find the plate.

Ichiro led off with a hard grounder that Delgado snagged. Stan Javier hit the ball hard, too, and this one went off Blue Jays reliever Matt DeWitt, Javier reaching safely. He soon took off for second base, and catcher Alberto Castillo's throw sailed into center field, Javier skipping to third. But Ed Sprague -- in the game after pinch-hitting earlier for Charles Gipson, who had pinch-run for Edgar Martinez -- struck out looking. Olerud drew an intentional walk, bringing up Bret Boone. DeWitt got ahead of Boone, oh-and-two, but then Boone battled back, fouling off a couple of pitches before running the count full ... at which point the Blue Jays made their only real mistake of the night.

Buck Martinez ordered DeWitt to throw ball four to Boone. Now, I know that Boone leads the American League with 104 RBI. But I also know that Mike Cameron's on-base percentage is higher than Brett Boone's batting average. Now, it's certainly possible that DeWitt just didn't feel comfortable throwing a full-count pitch to Boone, and if that was the case you can't really blame him. The real problem was that DeWitt couldn't finish Boone off after getting ahead of him, and of course Boone deserves a lot of the credit for that.

But facing Mike Cameron with the bases loaded and the winning run on third base ain't no bargain. And on a full count, DeWitt threw a fastball a foot higher than even the most liberal strike zone, and so Javier trotted home with the winning run, four hours and 37 minutes after Pineiro threw the game's first pitch.

A couple more notes about this one, which I witnessed from the third row of the upper deck ...

Piniella ordered David Bell to lay down a sacrifice bunt in the ninth. Though "successful" -- the runner did advance from first to second -- the bunt didn't lead to a run.

Piniella ordered Mike Cameron to lay down a sacrifice bunt in the 13th, but Cameron fouled off two attempts before (eventually) walking.

Piniella ordered Carlos Guillen to lay down a sacrifice bunt in the 13th, but Cameron fouled off two attempts before striking out looking.

Three bunts, or at least attempts to bunt, and zero runs. And in both of the failed attempts, the hitter found himself down in the count ... and as you know, batting stats drop significantly once a hitter gets behind in the count. What I'm saying is, I don't like the bunt, and this is just another reason; if the hitter can't lay it down, he's nearly turned into an automatic out ... and the men on base haven't moved an inch. What I'm also saying is, even the Mariners screw up the "fundamentals" sometimes. And while the Mariners are good at the little things, they're in first place not because they do those little things well, but because they do the big things well.

Speaking of big things, John Halama came up big last night with six shutout innings to earn the victory. The Mariners, who ran through their bullpen Sunday and Monday in Cleveland, had a huge luxury last night as the game went on and on and on, because they had Halama available to pitch and pitch and pitch. Most teams simply don't have anybody in the bullpen who can go more than three or (at most) four innings, which doesn't really matter unless (1) your starter gets knocked out very early, or (2) you have to play a very long game.

That said, I want to float a strange proposition ...

Most teams should employ not one, but two fifth starters.

Look, what's a fifth starter? A fifth starter is, obviously, your fifth-best starter, the kid who's trying to establish himself or perhaps the veteran who's trying to hang on for one more season. These are the guys who could use a little help, who should have their spots picked for them. Yet what do managers do? Right, they say, "Joe Thrower is my fifth starter until he's not."

But why not have two, complementary fifth starters, and decide which one pitches today based on the opponent? Both the Mariners and the Royals currently have the perfect pitchers for such an arrangement. The Mariners have Joel Pineiro, a right-handed rookie who throws very hard ... but they also have John Halama, a finesse lefty who's 29 years old and has started 77 games in the major leagues. The Royals have Chris George, a rookie left-hander who doesn't throw particularly hard ... but they also have Blake Stein, a hard-throwing right-hander who's 28 years old and has started 59 games in the major leagues.

The Mariners and Royals are more concerned with Pineiro and George than with Halama and Stein, and they should be. But if you spot Pineiro and George against the right teams, you accomplish two things. You limit their workloads -- Pineiro's 22, George is 21 -- and you have a better chance of finding situations in which they might most likely succeed, which I believe is a key to the development of young players, and especially young pitchers.

Like I said, the Mariners and the Royals are particularly well-suited to having co-fifth starters, but I also believe that nearly every team should have six pitchers on the roster who can pitch at least five innings in a game. I've sort of buried this at the bottom of the column, but wouldn't it make sense to at least think about reinventing the modern rotation?

TUESDAY, AUGUST 7
It's just one line in the 1968 Official Baseball Guide ...

                     G GS  IP  H  R ER  BB SO   ERA
Krieger, Vancouver*  1  1   3  3  1  1   1  1  3.00

That's actually an abridged version of the stat line, because the whole thing wouldn't fit here. You get the idea, though. So what makes him interesting, this left-hander who pitched the grand total of three innings in the Pacific Coast League in 1968?

Well, would you believe that those three innings constituted pitcher Ernest J. Krieger's entire professional career?

As it happened, I learned of this strange career from Ernest J. Krieger -- everyone calls him Kit -- himself. Saturday night at Portland's PGE Park, Kit was sitting right in front of me as I watched the home-team Beavers beat the visiting New Orleans Zephyrs.

So why did Kit make his professional debut -- and as it turned out, his only professional appearance -- at the highest level of the minor leagues?

"From 1967 to '69, I was the visiting clubhouse attendant for the Vancouver Mounties," Krieger remembered. "Shined the shoes, did the laundry, that kind of thing. And I also pitched a lot of batting practice, two or three times a week, sometimes more depending on how my arm felt. I probably threw in the low 80s, plus I had a pretty good slider and I messed around with a knuckleball. I was a lefty, so my pitches had good natural movement."

All that makes sense, of course. But a lot of guys can throw in the low 80s, and mess around with a knuckleball.

"The Mounties didn't have a license to sell liquor at the ballpark, and they drew often less than a thousand fans per game."

Indeed, in 1968 Vancouver drew only 82,028 fans, or roughly 1,100 per game. Vancouver also finished with the worst record in the Pacific Coast League, 58-88 and 27½ games out of first place.

"So toward the end of the season, I was walking through the stands with Lefty Dennis, our assistant GM, and I said to him, 'You ought to let me pitch a game. All my friends and family will come, and you'll double your crowd.' Dennis went to the GM, and the GM went to the manager, Mickey Vernon, who said, 'Krieger's not a prospect, but he won't embarrass himself.' And so the Mounties signed me to a one-month contract for $400 ... prorated to one day, which was $25."

"That one day was a Sunday, September the 8th, 1968. The last day of the season. I was still working as the clubhouse attendant, so before the game I was in the visitors' locker room, doing what I always did. When it was time to get ready to pitch, my brother took over for me."

Only 19 years old, Krieger got off to something of a rough start.

"Before the game, our catcher, Woody Huyke, came out to give the signals. I told him that I threw a fastball, a slider, and the knuckleball. He said to me, 'If you break my ----ing fingers with the knuckleball, I'll ----ing kill you.'

Krieger threw exactly one knuckleball.

"First inning, I gave up a run. We were in last place, and the night before, Joe Nossek, our center fielder, had pitched for us, and beat Hawaii. Well, I gave up a hit and a walk, and I hit a batter, loading the bases. The next hitter was Angel Bravo, who hit a little Texas Leaguer into center field. Nossek caught the ball, but his arm was so sore from the night before that he couldn't throw. Instead he just handed the ball to Tony La Russa -- our second baseman -- and the run scored.

"Somebody got on in the second inning, but I got out of that when Gene Freese hit into a 5-4-3 double play. And I retired the side in order in the third inning, the last out coming when I struck out Gail Hopkins. That was kind of strange, because Hopkins was very tough to strike out."

Hopkins struck out only twice in 68 at-bats in the Pacific Coast League that year, and in 1969 he struck out only 28 times in 373 at-bats while playing for the White Sox.

In the bottom of the third, Vernon lifted Krieger for a pinch-hitter. The strangeness wasn't nearly over, though. Ozzie Chavarria, who typically played a lot of positions anyway (though not necessarily in the same game), later pitched one perfect inning in his only mound appearance of the season.

And as Krieger remembers, "In the seventh inning we're still losing 1-0, but Steve Boros hit a home run to get me off the hook, and we wound up winning 3-1. Oh, and get this: the game lasted an hour and four minutes. Bill Fischer was pitching for Hawaii -- I believe it was the last game he ever pitched -- and you probably know that he had great control. Well, since this was the last game of the season, after I left the game, apparently everyone agreed that they'd hit the first pitch. And so the game lasted one hour and four minutes.

"Just last winter I spoke to Mickey Vernon, and asked him if he remembered the game that I pitched. He did remember, and he told me that after that season, Bowie Kuhn contacted him and said, 'I noticed that you guys played a game in an hour and four minutes. Do you have any ideas on how we can speed the games up?' "

That was 33 years ago, and the beat goes on.

Or at least the beat goes on with an occasional brief interruption. In 1969 the Portland Beavers were a member of the Pacific Coast League, just as they'd been in 1906. But in 1994 the Beavers left for Salt Lake City, and so Portland had only Class A baseball until this season. That was a strange situation, given that Portland is now the No. 24 media market in the United States, and could quite likely support a major-league club.

But a group in Portland purchased the Albuquerque club last winter, and so the Beavers have returned. And it couldn't have happened to a nicer ballpark. PGE Park is an old barn of a ballpark, built in 1926 and the third-oldest in the minor leagues. Nestled into the funky Goose Hollow neighborhood just a few blocks west of downtown Portland (and the incomparable Powell's Books), PGE Park holds nearly 20,000 fans and routinely draws 7,000 for Beavers games; on this night, there were nearly that many in the park.

We saw one hell of a game, too. Portland's starting pitcher, a 26-year-old right-hander named Jason Middlebrook, looked great through five innings, but left after seven frames with the game tied at two apiece. Middlebrook, once considered a great prospect, has been struggling for years, but this season he's become a prospect again. He consistently throws his fastball in the 92-94 range, features a sharp slider, and I wouldn't be at all surprised to see him pitching for the Padres next spring.

It was still 2-2 entering the bottom of the 10th, but Santiago Perez led off with a double, and Zephyrs closer Scott Linebrink wild-pitched Perez to third. Then, New Orleans manager Tony Pena ordered a pair of intentional walks, after which Linebrink threw the next pitch squarely into Ernie Young's back, and so Perez trotted home with the winning run.

I think that's a really lousy move, issue two intentional walks to load the bases, and then expecting your pitcher to throw quality strikes. And after the game Beavers manager Rick Sweet said, "Actually, what happened didn't totally surprise me. He had just walked two guys intentionally. It's a tough thing to do, throw eight pitches nice and easy and lob them outside, then all of a sudden it's clutch time and you've got to throw the ball over the middle of the plate."

Of course, the question I would ask Sweet is, "Would you have done the same thing?"

As for Kit Krieger, baseball is still in his blood. A history teacher by trade, Krieger also runs an outfit called Cubaball that conducts baseball-oriented tours of Cuba. Sounds like a good way to spend a week in February.

MONDAY, AUGUST 6
Before I start today, a preface ...

Today's column won't include much actual writing by me. I've received an immense amount of e-mail from Cardinal fans since last week, and so today I'd like to present a small percentage of that e-mail, along with my (relatively brief) responses. However, lest anyone think that I'm slacking off (more than usual), this week I'll have an extra column on Friday.

Now, the mail ...

Rob,

I enjoyed your piece on Ray Lankford. I agree, as a long-time Cardinal he does deserve the respect of the team and fans and to a great extent I think he had that respect. However, one key point that you miss is where would Ray play in this lineup? He doesn't deserve to play in the outfield in front of Drew, Pujols or Edmonds when you look at both offense and defense. I think your lineup is much better with Polanco at third base over Pujols, both offensively and defensively, so when Drew came off the DL, Ray was the odd man out. Ray did not want to be a backup player, though, so he needed a change of scenery. I hope he finds success in San Diego, and I'm sure the St. Louis fans will show him the appreciation he deserves when the Padres come to town next month.

Joe D
St. Charles, Mo.

You're right, Joe. J.D. Drew has to play, and you're not going to bench Pujols, everyone's choice for Rookie of the Year. So it comes down to Lankford vs. Polanco; if Lankford plays left field, then Pujols moves to third. Let's look at the two of them (stats are through yesterday's games, but they'll work for our purposes):

           AB  HR  Runs  RBI    OBP  Slug  OPS
Lankford  264  15   38    39   .345  .496  841
Polanco   362   3   52    26   .370  .412  782

Based on those numbers, one might conclude that Lankford is the more productive hitter, though of course Polanco's higher OBP makes him look better than their respective OPS's might lead you to believe.

Then there's the defense. Most Cardinal fans believe that Polanco is better at third base than Pujols, and most Cardinal fans believe that Pujols is better in left field than Lankford. If both are true, then it is likely also true that the Cardinals are, indeed, better off without Lankford. He's signed for a significant amount of money in 2002, and if Pujols isn't going to play third base, there simply isn't room on the roster for Lankford and his salary.

The Cardinals made a good trade and deserve great credit for doing so, but let's not run down a once-great-and-still-good ballplayer in the process.

Why should anyone respect Lankford? He complains about not being informed about things. Everyone forgets that two years ago he had knee surgery in the offseason and didn't inform the ballclub. The Cardinals could have had the time to sign a quality fourth outfielder, but they didn't find out until he got to spring training. And you make this big deal about OPS, but you forgot a couple of key stats:

1. He's hitting .185 with runners in scoring position, with 34 strikeouts.

2. He's hitting .143 with the bases loaded. 5 Strikeouts in 7 ABs.

When the chips are down, Lankford can't be counted on.

Kevin

Kevin's letter represents the most common sentiment that I received from Cardinal fans. And Kevin's tiny sample sizes notwithstanding, it's certainly true that Lankford hasn't been doing well in the clutch, this year or last.

But why? Is it something in Lankford's personality? Hardly. From 1995 through 1999, Lankford posted a 955 OPS with runners in scoring position, and an 847 OPS in late-and-close situations. So it's possible that Lankford's recent clutch struggles -- and it's true, he was awful last year, too -- are nothing but a statistical fluke, and that he'll get back to "normal" any day now. On the other hand, it's possible that his knee problems, which have cost him some speed, have also cost him something in clutch situations. But what that might be, I can't say.

You wrote that Ray Lankford is "a better player than at least a few outfielders who are in the Hall of Fame."

Ray Lankford is a great athlete, but I would never use the Hall of Fame in any sentence regarding him. Many a night, I have spent sitting in the bleachers at Busch Stadium and felt the cold chill of seeing Ray Lankford step in the batters box with two outs and runners in scoring position. The sound still echoes in my ear of the last inning ending graphite K painfully scratched onto my scorecard.

Ray was a Cardinal fan's constant heartbreak, an athlete who, on paper at least, seemed always worthy of Gold Glove consideration for his highlight catches and minimal errors, but caused much head-scratching as his relays always seemed to find the wrong base.

Ray seems to lack something vital. It's evidenced in his wayward throws from the outfield and the lost look he sometimes gets in his eyes while running the bases. Ray must believe in some way that first base is for weaklings, since he refuses to walk and attempts to turn any single into an extra base. Tony La Russa may or may not be a great manager. But if I had two outs and two on in the ninth in a tie ball game, I would much rather see him send Paquette or Robinson to the plate over Lankford. However, I have spent many nights suffering nightmares in which the next man coming to the plate was always Ray Lankford. Respect? La Russa had it for Ray and lost it. Just like millions of others in Redbird nation.

Sign me,
Sickened in St. Louie

My comment about Ray Lankford being better than some Hall of Famers was sophistry, in the sense that it was something of a misleading argument. It's certainly true that Lankford is better than at least a few Hall of Famers -- Chick Hafey, Ross Youngs, Lloyd Waner (just to name three) -- but it's also true that you could say the same thing about many, many players.

But Sickened's comments are pure sports fan, long on emotion and short -- very short -- on logic and objective information. As I noted earlier, Lankford's stats in clutch situations were always quite acceptable until the last two seasons. And to suggest that Lankford won't take a walk ... well, that's just silly. Lankford's always drawn a lot of walks, and this season his walk rate was third on the club, behind only Edmonds and McGwire.

But see, it's easy to get down on a player, to the point that everything he does seems wrong. Even when a lot of it's right.

I have to disagree with your defense of Ray Lankford. He has failed miserably in the job he is supposed to do. Every player has a role to play for his team. Generally, players fall into two categories -- "table setters" and "run producers." It is unfair to compare these two distinct (usually) types of players. On the Cardinals, Polanco and Vina are the principal "table setters." Their job is to get on base with a high frequency, so that Pujols, McGwire, Drew and Edmonds can drive them in. Of the "run producers," Lankford is the worst on the Cardinals, even by your own statistics. Also, the two players just ahead of him, Edmonds and McGwire, have said they are having down years. So Lankford is the worst of his type on the team. Furthermore, he was due to be paid a little over $8 million next year. It made sense to move him.

Ray Lankford was an excellent player for many years. He deserves the fans' adoration for those efforts. In the past two years, however, his skills have deteriorated. You cannot just keep sending the guy out there as a thank-you for his work over the years. I hope he is able to restart his career in San Diego. Thanks for reading,
Dan Krasnoff

I don't really agree with the suggestion that "Lankford is paid X dollars to drive in runs. He's not driving in runs, so he had to go."

Look, Ray Lankford may not be driving in runs, but does that mean he's not a good ballplayer? Seems to me that if you've got a guy with a .345 on-base percentage and a .496 slugging percentage, you should be able to find a job that he can do. Granted, St. Louis might not be the place for him, but I think the guy can still help somebody.

You are one of my favorite columnists, mostly because you do more than a superficial analysis of baseball stats and trends. And though you may never read this because of the volume of mail you probably get, I appreciate having an e-mail address I can contact you at so I can respond to your columns with my own opinions.

Regarding Ray Lankford's worth to the Cardinals, you defend him in part because his combined slugging and on base averages are a respectable 841. But if you look a little deeper, you'll find that this is a deceiving figure. Lankford started out the season very well, but for the last two months he's been lousy. It appears that pitchers have adjusted to him, and if he doesn't make an adjustment of his own, his career could be in jeopardy.

For the first eight weeks of the season (through May 27), Lankford had a slugging average of .618. For the following eight weeks (May 28 through July 25), however, his slugging average was only .379. His on-base percentage was .381 for the first eight weeks but only .313 for the next eight weeks.

As a result, his OPS for the first eight weeks was 999, but for the past eight weeks it has been 692. So I can understand why Tony La Russa would find it difficult to keep putting Lankford in his lineup each day.

Although you're right about a high strikeout total not necessarily being a problem in itself, a sharp rise in strikeouts probably indicates another, more fundamental problem.

Last year, Lankford struck out in 32 percent of his plate appearances, the highest in baseball for batters with at least 300 plate appearances. This year he's striking out even more. Lankford may feel he deserves more respect, but sometimes a swift (verbal) kick in the butt by the manager is more likely to motivate a batter than simply pencilling him into the lineup because of past accomplishments.

Lankford has been an underrated player in the past, but his present trends point to trouble.

Thanks,

Bill Bell
Portland, Oregon

Good points, Bill. You know what's frustrating to me about what happened to Lankford in St. Louis, though? The noise. It seems to me that Lankford left St. Louis not because of his performance, but because of his salary and, perhaps, his personality. And that's OK, because sometimes a player just isn't a good fit for a particular situation, and so he has to find a new situation. Fair enough.

But say it's about his salary and his personality.

Because it's not about strikeouts, not really; Mark McGwire is striking out at virtually the same rate as Lankford, and nobody is trying to run Big Mac out of town.

It's not about his performance over the last eight weeks, because veterans don't get dumped because of eight lousy weeks. Eight weeks is, in the context of a long and productive career, nothing.

And it's not about situational stats, not really; while Lankford's 710 OPS with runners in scoring position is nearly the worst on the club, it's not appreciably worse than those posted by Polanco (742) or Edgar Renteria (728). And more to the point, it's only 65 at-bats. I promise you that I could go back through baseball history, select virtually any great hitter, and find a 65-at-bats stretch in which he performed poorly with runners in scoring position, or with the bases loaded, or in close-and-late situations.

Ray Lankford may be washed up, but then again, he might not be. He's gone to a club that values on-base percentage, so now it's up to him. And if you'd like to read a great perspective on Lankford's "situation" from someone who's actually seen Lankford play all season, I heartily recommend Bernie Miklasz's most recent column in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.

P.S. I received an immense amount of e-mail about last week's column on Joe Jackson, and I apologize to those of you who didn't receive a response. I haven't seen anything yet that's caused me to change my mind about Jackson, but some interesting avenues of inquiry have been opened. And I suspect that I'll write more about the subject before I'm permanently banned from sportwriting.

THURSDAY, AUGUST 2
Dipping into the ol' e-mailbag for the first time in a while ...

Rob,

I am a lifelong Cardinals fan, and have been a Ray Lankford fan until the last two years, although he is one of the streakiest hitters I have ever seen. He is currently the scapegoat for the Cardinals' bad season here in St. Louis, and watching him this year has made me sick at times.

But after it was announced that he would waive his no-trade clause, I looked at his numbers, and his OPS was 841, fifth-highest on the Cardinals, trailing J.D. Drew and Albert Pujols (by a country mile), and Jim Edmonds and Mark McGwire (only slightly).

There are a lot of underachievers on the Cards this year, but he clearly isn't one of them. Granted, his OPS doesn't reflect his 40-percent strikeout rate, but he appears better than the general perception of him. What do you think?

Thanks, Scott H.

When Lankford took his "leave of absence" (as the Cardinals are calling it), he told the St. Louis Post-Dispatch that the team wasn't showing him the respect he deserved.

Tony La Russa responded, "There isn't any other way we can show respect for this guy. He gets all the respect he earns. He's just got into a rut the last couple years where the swings and misses are driving him to the bench."

Managers hate strikeouts, Scott. Always have, always will. But a strikeout's no worse than a pop to the shortstop, or a fly ball to shallow left field. Yes, a strikeout is sometimes worse than a ground ball to the right side, or a fly to deep right. But most of the time, a strikeout is just another out. Come to think of it, sometimes a strikeout is better than other outs. A strikeout isn't a ground-ball double play, and a strikeout means the pitcher had to throw at least three pitches, and sometimes many more (Billy Beane calls this the "pound of flesh").

OK, now let's compare Lankford's production to that of the other Cardinals with at least 200 plate appearances:

                2001 OPS
J.D. Drew         1115
Albert Pujols      988 
Jim Edmonds        864
Mark McGwire       856
Ray Lankford       841
Placido Polanco    783 
Fernando Vina      769
Craig Paquette     743
Edgar Renteria     635
Mike Matheny       594

Yes, I know that Renteria and Matheny are both defensive specialists at key positions, but they're absolutely killing the Cardinals at the plate, who are essentially playing with a six-hitter lineup these days. And Craig Paquette is ... well, he's Craig Paquette, with a .296 OBP this year that's just a bit higher than his .275 career mark. Yet Tony La Russa has found more than 200 plate appearances for Paquette.

Oh, and La Russa has also found playing time for Bobby Bonilla (730 OPS in 131 at-bats) and Kerry Robinson (677 OPS in 108 at-bats). And somehow, Ray Lankford is the problem here? We're talking about a guy with the fifth-best OPS on the team, and an 863 OPS against right-handed pitching this season ... and La Russa doesn't think that Lankford is helping him?

Does all this excuse Lankford, who has essentially abandoned his team in the middle of a pennant race? No, it does not. But let us, just for a moment, try to understand this professional athlete who, granted, makes about a gajillion dollars per year. Ray Lankford has been a Cardinal for 14 years, and reached the majors in 1990; no other current Cardinal has been in St. Louis anywhere near as long as Lankford has. What's more, he's been an excellent player for virtually his entire career, a better player than at least a few outfielders who are in the Hall of Fame.

If any Cardinal deserves respect, it's Ray Lankford, who has done nothing but produce for more than a decade now. And that includes this season, a season in which the Cardinals are run-starved.

You know what you do with Ray Lankford? You write his name into the lineup as your left fielder any time the enemy hurler throws with his right flipper. And you pat him on the butt and say, "Go get 'em, Ray."

If that happens, though, it appears that it may be in San Diego, where Padres GM Kevin Towers has recently seen the virtues of on-base percentage. While it's true that the Padres currently employ six major-league outfielders, it's also true that Lankford's 841 OPS is higher than five of those Padre outfielders ... and the lone exception being Tony Gwynn, who's got a 924 OPS but is rarely healthy enough to play. Next year -- Lankford is signed through 2002 (with an option for 2003) -- the Padres could feature a fairly productive outfield with Lankford in left field, Mark Kotsay in center, and Bubba Trammell in right.

And the Cardinals? A year ago, they finished fourth in the National League in run production, and won a division title. This year, they're ninth in the National League in run production, and are in third place. And getting more at-bats for Craig Paquette and Kerry Robinson ain't going to help much.

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 1
Here are takes on the biggest deals right before the trade deadline.

Red Sox get     Expos get
Ugueth Urbina   Tomo Ohka
                Rich Rundles

The Red Sox typically feature one of the American League's top bullpens, but this year the Sox rank just sixth in the league with a 3.70 ERA, and of course Urbina figures to lower that mark.

As for Tomo Ohka, I still think he's going to be a quality starter in the major leagues. But it's become quite clear over the years that the Red Sox simply don't have any interest in developing young pitchers, so why not trade Ohka? And if he develops as he should, the Expos have the makings of a solid rotation for years to come. Rundles, a 20-year-old lefty, must have been hurt last year, pitched well in the Gulf Coast League but only 40 innings. This year, he's pitched quite well for Augusta in the Class A South Atlantic League: 2.43 ERA, 94 strikeouts and only 10 walks in 115 innings. Looks like a pretty good prospect, and you know he has a good arm if he was drafted in the third round.

Meanwhile, the Red Sox now have two solid closers in Urbina and Derek Lowe ... but they could still use a leadoff man, because Jose Offerman seems to be just about finished.

Braves get      Royals get
Rey Sanchez     Brad Voyles
                Alejandro Machado

The Braves get a Gold Glove-quality shortstop, albeit one who contributes little to his team's run production (certainly a sore spot for the Braves). And after this season, Sanchez will leave as a free agent and the Braves will receive a draft pick as compensation.

And the Royals? Neither Voyles nor Machado are Grade A prospects, but Kansas City general manager Allard Baird probably did about as well as could have been expected, given both Sanchez's contract status and Baird's own inability to negotiate. Voyles is a 24-year-old relief pitcher with solid stuff who still needs to improve his control, and hasn't yet reached Triple-A. Machado, a second baseman, is still a baby, only 19 years old. He doesn't have any power at all, but does have great speed and decent plate discipline, though the Royals will likely beat the latter out of him.

Astros get       Rockies get
Pedro Astacio    Scott Elarton
                 ????

From the frying pan into the fire. Both Astacio and Elarton might reasonably have assumed that if they did get traded, they'd catch a break in their new homes. Not so. Elarton now moves to the toughest pitcher's park of our time, and Astacio goes to what might be the second-toughest. In the short-term -- that is, for the next two months -- this deal works better for the Astros. Astacio is just 6-13 for the Rockies this season, but let's look at his road numbers this season, along with Elarton's:

           ERA   IP  Hits  HR  BB  SO
Astacio   4.26   80   77    7  26  68
Elarton   6.67   54   67   12  23  32

Elarton's been a disaster this year, and it hasn't really mattered where he's pitched. Remember, this is a guy who, just two years ago, looked like a future Cy Young candidate. Now he'll call Coors Field his home ballpark, and it might reasonably be posited that his career is in grave danger.

But we can't really evaluate this deal until we know who the Rockies receive as the Player to Be Named Later. If it's really Daryle Ward (as has been rumored) then we might argue that this ain't Rockies GM Dan O'Dowd's finest hour. Ward's a fine hitter and would post some awesome stats at Coors Field. But he should never play any position other than DH or first base, and unfortunately neither of those are an option with the Rockies.

Twins get       Mets get
Rick Reed       Matt Lawton

One thing that might worry me if I were a Twins fan, or Terry Ryan ... Over the last four seasons, Rick Reed has pitched significantly better at Shea Stadium than on the road. His year-by-year splits:

        Home ERA   Road ERA
1998      2.24       5.38
1999      3.86       5.14
2000      4.08       4.13
2001      3.01       4.31
Totals    3.13       4.75

What might account for this significant difference between Reed's performance at home and on the road? I believe it's the dimensions of Shea Stadium, which is fairly tough on power hitters (Reed, of course, is a righty). Over those same four years listed in the table, Reed has allowed 39 homers at Shea, 58 on the road. And that difference is even greater than it might appear, because Reed has thrown 44 more innings at home than on the road. Since 1998, Reed has allowed 0.97 homers per nine innings at Shea, but 1.64 homers per nine innings outside of Queens.

That's obviously a significant difference ... and the Metrodome is a good place for left-handed power hitters.

All this doesn't mean that Rick Reed can't pitch well for the Twins -- anything can happen in two months -- but if I were a betting man, I would bet against it.

But is Matt Lawton a significant loss? He leads the Twins with 63 walks and a .396 on-base percentage. On the other hand, he's a right fielder with a .439 slugging percentage, which isn't particularly impressive. Still, Lawton is probably Minnesota's third-most productive hitter, behind Doug Mientkiewicz and Corey Koskie. And with the Twins already playing two outfielders who can't hit -- Torii Hunter and Jacque Jones -- one wonders how the Twins will replace Lawton's production. Given Reed's age (almost 36) and his contract (signed through 2003), this deal looks like a net W for the Mets.

Yankees get          Padres get
Sterling Hitchcock   Brett Jodie
                     Darren Blakely

Jodie is a big right-hander who relies on finesse and outstanding control rather than velocity, and this year he's gone 10-4 with a 2.87 ERA in Triple-A ... and that's come after he essentially skipped Double-A. It's said that Jodie regularly throws his fastball in the low 90s, though his strikeout rate this season -- 59 K's in 119 innings -- doesn't really support that notion. Still, with the proper care and feeding, Jodie figures to be a solid middle-of-the-rotation starter as soon as next season.

Blakely's a 24-year-old outfielder with "tools: who isn't yet much of a baseball player. He still hasn't played well at the Class AA level, and probably won't ever develop enough plate discipline to play regularly in the majors.

Hitchcock is, of course, a fine pitcher. But is there any doubt that he, like Rick Reed, has benefited greatly from his home ballpark? From 1997 through 2001, Hitchcock posted a 3.84 ERA in San Diego ... and a 5.44 ERA on the road. So we shouldn't be at all surprised to see Hitchcock struggle in pinstripes.

Rob Neyer is a Senior Writer for ESPN.com. His column runs Monday through Thursday. You can e-mail Rob at rob.neyer@dig.com.